
Qass. 
Book. 



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CHATTANOOGA 



AND 



CHIGKAMAUGA 



REPRINT OF 



Gen. H. V. BOYNTON'S LETTERS 



TO THE 



Cincinnati Commercial Gazette, 



AUGUST, 1888. 



Second Edition, with Corrections. 



WASHINGTON, D. C: 

GEO. R. GRAY, PRINTER. 

1891. 



/ 

CHATTANOOGA 

AND 7i^ 

CHICKAMAUGA. 

REPRINT OF 



O-'' 



Gen. H. V. BOYNTON'S LETTERS 



TO THE 



Cincinnati Commercial Gazette, 



AUGUST, 1888. 



Secoucl £(litioii, with Corrections. 



WASHINGTON, D. C: 

GEO. R. GRAY, PRINTER. 

1891. 



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1 



PREFACE. 



Comrades of the Society of the Army of the Cumberland: 

When General H. V. Boynton's letters recently appeared 
in the Cincinnati Commercial Gazette, so vividly portraying 
tlie achievements and heroism of the Army of the Cumber- 
land in its campaign for the possession of Chattanooga, in- 
cluding the inevitable incident thereto, the battle of Chicka- 
mauga, I thought how agreeable it would be for each member 
of the society to have a copy for perusal at our approaching 
reunion on the twenty-fifth anniversary of Chickamauga. 

Accordingly I asked General Boynton's permission to print 
these letters in pamphlet form, as advance sheets of any 
volume in which he may determine to put them with other 
matter. To this he most cheerfully assented in the follow- 
ing letter : 

Washington, Sept. 1, 1888. 
My Dear General : You are welcome to the Chickamauga 
letters for any use you choose to make of them. While the 
salient features of both days' battle are easily understood, 
the details of movements by brigades are in many cases in- 
tricate. For this reason various errors may have been made 
in the text. If those who observe them will take the trouble 
to correct them before the public, they would thus assist in 
establishing the correct history of a battle in which the Army 
of the Cumberland should lake great pride. 
Very truly yours, 

H. V. BOYNTON. 

General W. S. Rosecrans. 

With this explanation, the letters are given in the order 
of their respective dates. 

W. S. ROSECRANS. 



Washington, August 3. [Special.] — In two preliminary 
letters about Chicamauga the attempt was made to describe 
the field as it appears to-day, and to present some of the 
scenes of the battle which came rushing back over the plains 
of memory with a power suggestive of the departed legions 
that once clothed these farms, forests, and ridges with the 
terrible magnificence of battle. 

In a sense, to write of Chicamauga is to try to excite in- 
terest in a subject which far too many regard as worn ; but 
to the veterans who fought there it will never be a thread- 
bare story. For that generation which has been born and 
has come to manhood since Chattanooga was won by the 
Union arms, there is no campaign which can be studied with 
greater profit, or which will more richly repay the reader. 
History has not yet done justice to Chickamauga, but its vor- 
dict is sure. Many of the misconceptions of the days follow- 
ing the battle still exist in the popular mind. It may be 
years before they are cleared away ; but eventually the 
Chickamauga campaign will stand in the history of our war 
as unequaled in its strategy by any other movement of the 
contest, and as unsurpassed, and probably not equaled, for 
the stubbornness and deadliness which marked the splendid 
fighting of Unionist and rebel alike ; and, furthermore, it 
will stand as a substantial Union victory. 

Just in proportion as the credit due is awarded to those 
who planned and executed the campaign will well-merited 
condemnation be meted out to those at Washington who in- 
sisted upon forcing the movement without regard to proper 
and vital preparation, who withheld re-enforcements, and 
who, in spite of public and private warnings which it was 
criminal not to heed, made rebel concentrations against Rose- 
crans possible from in front of Washington itself, and from 
Charleston, Mobile, and Mississippi. 

It will b£ the purpose of a few letters to go over some of 
the well-known ground of this campaign with a view of 
enforcing the ideas expressed in general terms above, and 
attempting to present a clear account of this most involved, 
and still seriously misunderstood battle. The strategy — 
matchless in our war — which compelled Bragg to abandon 
Chattanooga ; the life and death struggle for concentrating 
the Union army when Rosecrans, against the protests of 
W^ashington authorities that it could not be true, found his 
widely separated corps confronted with re-enforcements from 
every part of the Confederacy ; and, lastly, the great battle 
in the Chickamauga forests for the possession of Chattanooga, 



are eacli most fruitful and interesting themes. The present 
letter will relate to the first-named subject, the strategy of 
the Chickamauga campaign. 

Marching from Murfreesboro on the 23d of June, 1863, 
General Rosecrans had advanced against Bragg, who was 
strongly fortified, and whose lines, besides, occupied gaps 
and ranges of great natural strength. By brilliant strategy, 
with the loss of only 586 killed and wounded, and thirteen 
captured or missing, the Army of the Cumberland, with its 
nine divisions and twenty brigades, operating through six- 
teen days of continuous rain, maneuvred Bragg, with his 
seven divisions and twenty-three brigades, out of his natural 
and artificial strongholds, and forced him across the Tennes- 
see. Up to that time there had been no strategic campaign 
to equal this, and it was soon to be far surpassed, except in 
the one element of loss, by the campaign to follow it. So 
brilliant had been the conception and the execution that all 
the corps commanders, headed by Greneral Thomas, hastened 
to call on General Rosecrans and ofi'er the warmest congratu- 
lations. 

At the close of the Tullahoma campaign Bragg occupied 
Chattanooga and the mountain passes above and below it. 
Rosecrans's army lay along the western base of the Cumber- 
land Mountains, its right above Winchester and its left at 
McMinnville. Here General Rosecrans at once began the 
most vigorous preparations for another campaign for the 
occupation of Chattanooga. Because the necessities of the 
case compelled secrecy as one of the main elements of success, 
there was soon at Washington a manifestation of unreasoning 
impatience over what was criticized as the inaction of the 
Union commander ; but those who were on the ground know 
well the unceasing activity and energy with which the work 
progressed of accumulating sufficient supplies of food, mate- 
rial, and ammunition, preparing the means for crossing the 
Tennessee and obtaining the necessary knowledge of the 
mountain passes, roads, and trails by which the army must 
move. Rosecrans's sui)plies reached him over a badly equipped 
line of worn railroad, a hundred and thirteen miles in length, 
and, as can be readily understood, when the daily wants of 
a great army preparing for extended movement and battle 
are considered, the matter of accumulating a surplus of sup- 
plies was not the task of a day or a week. With every eifort 
the railroad was not repaired until July 25, and the forward 
movement began on the 14th of August. 

A glance at the map will disclose the great natural obsta- 
cles which lay between General Rosecrans and Chattanooga. 
As his army faced toward the latter point, the Cumberland 



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Mountains, with a general elevation of 2,200 feet, rose before 
it. The escarpment was everywhere precipitous, and desti- 
tute of every means of approach except narrow mountain 
roads and trails, with the one exception that a short railroad 
ran from Cowan to Tracy City, on the summit of the range. 
To the eastward this range dropped by like precipitous and 
difficult slopes into the valley of the Sequatchee River. Be- 
yond that stream rose the equally sharp cliffs of Walden's 
Ridge, with a general elevation of 1,300 feet. This fell off 
along tlie eastern and southern edge of the plateau into the 
valley of the Tennessee^ and overlooked it from the mouth 
of the Sequatchee River to a point far above Chattanooga. 
It was fifty miles as the crow flies from the lines of Rose- 
crans's army across this continuous mountain region to the 
valley of the Tennessee. This river was broad and deep, 
and presented in itself the most serious natural obstacle 
which the Union army had encountered since it left the Ohio 
River. It was 2,700 feet wide at Bridgeport, and 1,254 feet 
at Caperton_, the points where the bridges were subsequently 
thrown. 

On the left bank of the river, the stronghold of Chatta- 
nooga lying belli nd the river, and the great ranges to the 
westward between Rosecrans's position and his own, might 
well seem to Bragg impregnable, in fact almost unassailable. 
First, toward the west, came the Lookout range, rising 
abruptly from the river to the height of 2,200 feet, and 
stretching southwestwardly far into Georgia and Alabama. 
Its western piecipices looked down into the narrow valley of 
Lookout Creek. Beyond the latter rose the equally precipi- 
tous cliffs of the Raccoon Mountains, the latter having the 
same general elevation as the Lookout range. 

The gorge oi' the Tennessee where it breaks through these 
mountain ranges is so narrow and so thoroughly commanded 
from the heights on both sides as to render it impracticable 
to so move an army as to attack it from the front or river 
side. 

With these giant obstacles to the progress of his columns, 
most serious even if they had been within the Union lines, 
but almost insuperable when found in an enemy's territory, 
and while he was bending every energy to complete prepara- 
tions for carrying out a brilliant plan of his own for over- 
coming them. General Rosecrans was astonished at receiving 
on August 4, only ten days after his railroad had been re- 
paired to the Tennessee River, a dispatch from Halleck say- 
ing : " Your forces must move forward without delay. You 
will daily report the movement of each corps till you cross 
the Tennessee River." 



8 

To a commander who was building boats, opening mount- 
ain roads, rushing the accumulation of stores, getting out 
material for four thousand feet of bridges, preparing to leave 
his base carrying provisions for twenty-five days, and am- 
munition for two battles, and crossing three mountain ranges 
and a deep and broad river, in an enemy's country, and in 
the face of an army, this dispatch was not only astounding, 
but discouraging and exasperating to the last degree. 

It had become a habit at Washington to sneer at the slow- 
ness of General Rosecrans, as it was later to denounce Gen- 
eral Thomas in similar terms at Nashville. There was no 
more reason or justice in the one case than in the other. The 
verdict of history has been reached in the case of General 
Thomas. It is sure to come, and to be the same in this mat- 
ter, for Rosecrans. 

To this dispatch, which can only be excused on the ground 
of wholly inexcusable ignorance of the active preparations 
in progress and the natural difficulties of an advance, Gen- 
eral Rosecrans replied with his accustomed clearness and 
spirit: "Your dispatch ordering me to move forward with- 
out delay, reporting the movements of each corps till I cross 
the Tennessee, is received. As I have determined to cross 
the river as soon as practicable, and have been making all 
j)reparations and getting such information as may enable me 
to do so without being driven back, like Hooker, I wish to 
know if your order is intended to take awa}' my discretion 
as to the time and manner of moving my troops." To this 
Halleck responded : " The orders for the advance of your 
army, and that it be reported daily, are peremptory." Gen- 
eral Rosecrans immediately wrote the following reply, and, 
calling his corps commanders together, read the dispatches 
given above. There was no dissent from the proposition that 
at that stage of their preparations it was impossible to move. 
He then read his reply as follows, and all approved and 
agreed that they should support him : 

"General Halleck: My arrangements for beginning a 
continuous movement will be completed and the execution 
begun Monday next. We have information to show that 
crossing the Tennessee between Bridgeport and Chattanooga 
is impracticable, but not enough to show whether we had 
better cross above Chattanooga and strike Cleveland, or below 
Bridgeport and strike in their rear. The preliminary move- 
ment of troops for the two cases are very different. It is nec- 
essary to have our means of crossing the river completed, and 
our supplies provided to cross sixty miles of mountains and 
sustain ourselves during the operations of crossing and fight- 
ing, before we move. To obey your order literally would 



9 

be to push our troops into tlie mountains on narrow and diffi- 
cult roads, destitute of pasture and forage, and short of water, 
where they woukl not be able to maneuver as exigencies may 
demand, and would certainly cause ultimate delay and prob- 
able disaster. If, therefore, the movement which I propose 
cannot be regarded as obedience to your order, I respectfully 
request a modification of it or to be relieved from the com- 
mand." 

On the following day Halleck replied as follows: 

"I have communicated to you the wishes of the Govern- 
ment in plain and unequivocal terms. The objective I'^as been 
stated, and you have been directed to lose no time in reach- 
ing it. The means you are to employ and the roads you are 
to follow are left to your own discretion. If you wish to 
prom])tly carry out the wishes of the Government you will 
not stop to discuss mere details. In such matters I do not 
interfere." 

This was answered the same day by General Rosecrans as 
follows : 

"Your dispatch received. I can only repeat the assurance 
given before the issuance of the order. This army shall move 
with all dispatch compatible with the successful execution of 
our work. We are pressing everything to bring up forage 
for our animals. The present rolling-stock of the road will 
barely suffice to keep us day by day here, but I have bought 
fifty more freight cars, which are arriving. Will advise you 
daily." 

This was the last of interference from Washington, but, 
accustomed as all there were to interfering at will, and direct- 
ing affairs according to the situation as they saw it, they 
could not brook such manifestly proper independence as was 
shown by Rosecrans, and from that time forward there was 
needed only an excuse to insure his removal. 

Had there been a tithe of the attention given to preventing 
the rebels from concentrating on his front from every part of 
the Confederacy — in fact, bringing Longstreet's veterans 
from the lines under Halleck's own eyes — that there was to 
the kind of interference which has been noticed, Bragg would 
have been destroyed in front of Chattanooga. But this sub- 
ject properly belongs in a succeeding letter. The dispatches 
given above are well known, but their reproduction will 
prove a convenience to readers who may not cany their ex- 
act terms in mind. 

Ten days later, namely, on August 14, the movement to 
secure Chattanooga began. A glance at the map will reveal 
its strategy. 



10 

RosecraiiP had decided to cross the Tennessee in the vicin- 
ity of Bridgeport, and subsequently the Raccoon and Lookout 
Mountain ranges at points south of Chattanooga, and thus 
compel Bragg to evacuate the place or to come out of it and 
fight for liis line of communications. It is easily seen that 
if after crossing the river the enemy, warned in time, should 
he found in force on the western slopes of these ranges fur- 
ther progress in that direction would have been impossible, 
and a return to the north bank of the river obligatory. It 
was, therefore, necessary to wholly deceive Bragg as to the 
points of crossing. 

Burnside was marching from Kentucky into East Tennes- 
see. Any apparent movement of the Army of the Cumber- 
land in force in that direction would natuially lead Bragg to 
believe that a junction of the Union forces was contemplated 
on h'S right. 

Everything being ready, Crittenden opened the campaign 
with the Twenty-first Corps. Leaving his camps at Hills- 
hnro', Manchester, and McMinnville on the 16th of August, 
he ciossed the Cumberland Mountains and occupied tlie 
Sequachee Valley from a point between Jasper and Dunlap 
to Pik-'ville. Van Cleve lield the hitter place. Palmer was 
established at Dunlap, and Wood at Anderson, between 
Dunlap and Jasper. All built extensive camp fires and 
moved about in such ways as to convey to observei's from the 
heights the impression that the whole army was moving. 
Meantime Minty's active cavalry had moved through Sparta 
and driven Dibrell's cavalry eastward through Crossville, on 
to the Tennessee, and over it, and Dibrell, having come to 
reconnoiter and see what was going on, naturally got the idea 
that Rosecrans's army was coming. The crossing of the 
Cumberland was but the first step of the imposing diversion. 
Though the raountsiin roads were few and very difficult, 
Crittenden's movements over them had been completed ex- 
actly on time. The advance over Walden's Ridge, equally 
difficult, though it was not quite as high as the main range, 
was immediately undertaken. Minty, on the extreme left, 
appeared on the Tennessee more than thirty miles above 
Blythe's Ferry, where he made most energetic commotion. 
Hazen reached the river in the vicinity of Dallas. Two 
brigades were strung out along the edge of the cliff's on the 
top of Walden's Ridge, where they overlooked Blythe's Ferry, 
and could be seen from the other side of the river. Minty, 
with his troopers, swept down the valley of the Tennessee to 
near Chattanooga. Wilder and Wagner also appeared in the 
valley. While a show of building boats was made in the 
small streams about Blythe's Ferry, Wilder from the heights 



11 

of Walden's Ridge, opposite Chattanooga, opened fire on the 
town with artillery. Bragg was thoroughly deceived. For- 
rest was ordered far np the Tennessee to Kingston to watch 
for the expected crossing. Bnckner was ordered from East 
Tennessee toward Blythe's Ferry. 

As may he supposed, Wilder' s cannonading ])roduced the 
wildest excitement in Chattanooga. The rolling-stock of 
the railroads was hastened out of reach. Thp depots of sup- 
plies were moved cut of the range of the unexpected bom- 
bardment. I). H. Hill's corps was hurried off" to guard the 
river above, and other heavy forces were moved in-the same 
direction. Everything done by Bragg was based upon the 
idea that Rosecians was moving in iorce to ])oints on the 
river above the city. 

Meantime the real movement was going on quietly sixty 
to eighty miles in the opposite direction, in the vicinity of 
Bridgeport and tStevenson. A force of cavalry for the pur- 
poses of observation, and to convey Ihe idea by quick move- 
ments that Rosecrans was feigning below, while really ex- 
pecting to cross above the city, was sent as far westward as 
Decatur. Thus Rosecrans was operating along tlie river 
through a hui.dred miles of mountain region and fifty miles 
of low country beyond, and in sp te of the natural difficul- 
ties every part of the plan was working with precision. 

Thomas and McCook on the right moved at the same time 
with Crittenden. Reynolds, of Thomas's corps, had marched 
in advance and repaired the roads by way of University, and 
down the eastern slope of the mountain to Jasper. Brannan 
followed him, and both were at first kept well out of sight 
of the river. Baird and Negley came down nearer to Bridge- 
port, and McCook descended back of Stevenson. With the 
exception of Sheridan, at Bridgeport, all were kept well out 
of sight from the enemy's cavalty on the left bank. 

Sheridan alone made a show of his presence and openly 
began the construction of a trestle through the shoal water, 
in order to lessen the length of the floating bridge. As 
this was without a decided show of strength it deepened 
the impression that the movements on this wing were the 
feint and those toward the upj)er river the real move. In 
fact, after watching Sheridan's trestle building for a while 
from the other side of the river, Anderson's brigade of 
infantry, the only infantry force available to oppose 
a passage of the river, was withdrawn and sent to Chatta- 
nooga. 

The bridge for Caperton's Ferry was brought down on a 
train, which was halted out of sight, and a road cut for its 
transportation through the woods to a point near its desti- 



12 

nation, where the troops which were to lay it were drilled in 
their work. 

Early on the 29th fifty hoats, each carrying fifty men, 
were brought out of the woods near Caperton's, rushed 
across an open field, launched, and quickly rowed to the op- 
posite shore. The Confederate cavalry pickets were driven 
off and twenty-five hundred men held the south bank. The 
bridge was promptly laid. Davis was soon over, and then 
McCook's entire corps, with cavalry, started promptly for 
Valley Head, forty miles down the Lookout range. Rey- 
nolds collected boats at Shellmonnd, Brannan had built 
rafts and cut out canoes at the mouth of Battle Creek. The 
long bridge was successfully laid at Bridgeport, and before 
Bragg had recovered from his surprise, in fact before he had 
comprehended the extent of the movement, Rosecrans, with 
two corps, was over the river and moving on his communi- 
cations. 

As soon as the crossing was assured, Crittenden marched 
with celerity by way of the Sequatchee Valley towards the 
bridges and was soon across with the main body and advanc- 
ing on the left of it directly towards Chattanooga. 

This crossing of the Tennessee was a great feat. The 
bridges were not sufficient for the army. Reynolds gathered 
small boats and improvised his own means of crossing. Bran- 
nan 's men had cut out canoes from immense poplars and 
launched them in Battle Creek out of sight. Some of them 
would hold fifty men. They also built rafts, one of them 
large enough to carry artillery. These, with an abandoned 
rebel pontoon boat, constituted Bran nan's flotilla. When 
the signal was given the whole swept out from behind the 
bushes which concealed the mouth of Battle Creek and made 
for the opposite shore. The rebel pickets withdrew and the 
crossing was secured. Then all his men who could swim, 
piling their guns, clothing, and accouterments on a few fence 
rails, pushed these before them and thus gained the opposite 
bank. Later, Wilder swan his mounted brigade across the 
river and joined Crittenden south of Chattanooga. Halleck 
must have had this ability for crossing a river in the pres- 
ence of an enemy in mind when he telegraphed Rosecrans, a 
few weeks before, to move at once and keep moving. 

But this crossing, and the grand diversion which made it 
possible, were only the preliminary, and by no means the 
formidable parts of the movement. To complete it, Rose- 
crans was to cut loose from his base, carry twenty-five 
day's supplies and sufficient ammunition for two battles, 
cross two precipitous and difficult mountain ranges wholly 
within the enemy's territory, and their passes presumably 



13 

strengthened and defended, and, after crossing the last range 
at widely separated points, to descend into the valley in the 
rear of that enemy's stronghold, prepared for hattle or any 
other contingencies which might arise on this distant and 
isolated theater of action. 

When Bragg discovered the real point of crossing and the 
lines of actual movement it was too late to recall the forces 
dispatched up the Tennessee or to post columns of sufficient 
strength on the slopes before Kosecrans to impede his ad- 
vance in force. How strong the positions thus turned by 
the Union forces were will appear from the statement that 
so precipitious and otherwise difficult were the roads over 
these ranges that at several of them it required a day and a 
night for a division with its artillery and reduced trains to 
make the ascent. 

The Union commander had delayed his movement until 
the corn was ripe in order that it might not be necessary to 
carry grain for his animals, which would have largely in- 
creased his trains — so careful, thoughtful, and wise was he in 
every detail of preparation. 

Bragg's failure to resit in the vicinity of Rosecrans's cross- 
ings and at the crossings of Raccoon Mountains was due in 
part to the tact thai even after he knew that the heads of 
columns were over the river he was still inclined to look 
upon their movements as a feint, and to regard the real point 
of danger to lie above the city. Rosecrans, even after cross- 
ing, sought successfully to strengthen such impressions in 
Bragg's mind. He directed Wagner's, Wilder's, and Minty's 
brigades to report to Hazen, and with this force, some 7,000 
strong, the latter was ordered to make a conspicuous show 
of crossing the river far above Chattanooga. This active and 
efficient officer admirably executed his orders. By extended 
fires, by marchings and countermarchings, by moving his 
artillery continuously across openings in sight from the oppo- 
site bank, by buglers at widely separated points, and other 
similiar devices, he easily created the belief that an army was 
encamped on the right bank intending to cross. 

With the exception of this force, all of Rosecrans's army 
was south of the river on September 4, and on the move. 
The right was already well on its way. On the 6th his army 
had descended from Raccoon Mountain and occupied the 
valley between that range and the western slope of Lookoot 
from a point seven miles from Chattanooga to Valley Head, 
forty-two miles from the city. The next day McCook and 
Thomas began to ascend Lookout at points respectively forty- 
two and twenty-six miles from Chattanooga. On the 8th 
McCook' 8 troops were in motion down the eastern slope of 



14 

the mountain toward Alpine, and Thomas was descending 
from Steven's and Frick's G-ap, hoth of which were near 
where the road from Trenton, after running southwardly, is 
represented as leading over Lookout. Crittenden had pushed 
small portions of his command up mere mountain trails, and 
on the 9th these gained position where they could look down 
upon Chattanooga. They saw no flags, and soon discovered 
that Bragg had evacuated. The day before Wagner, still 
watching from the north hank of the river, had reported to 
Rosecrans that the enemy was leaving. The news came in 
the night, and Rosecrans ordered Crittenden to ascertain the 
situation. His detachments on the mountain had already 
discovered that the city was deserted. Crittenden was at 
once ordered to march around the north point of Lookout, 
and follow Bragg toward Ringgold. At night on the 9th 
Palmer and Van Cleve's divisions, were established at Ross- 
ville, five miles south of Chattanooga. 

Thus, in three weeks from the time his diversion towards 
Bragg's right began, and in five days from the time his army 
was over the river, Rosecrans had repeated the TuUahoma 
campaign on a far greater scale, and in the face of much 
more formidable obstacles, and absolutely without fighting, 
except as Minty had been slightly engaged with Dibrell near 
Sparta in the outset of the movement, had driven Bragg from 
the mountain stronghold of Chattanooga, the objective of 
the campaign. It was well said later by General Meigs, who 
came from Washington to Chattanooga after its final occupa- 
tion by the Union army, and spent some days in studying 
the movements by which it had been secured : " It is not 
only the greatest operation in our war, but a great thing 
when compared with any war." 

But the occupation of Chattanooga, in a military sense, 
was not accomplished by sending Crittenden's two divisions 
beyond it and one brigade into it. Bragg had only with- 
drawn to save his communications and supplies, and to await 
the re-enforcements he knew to be hastening from Virginia, 
from Mobile, and from Mississippi. The battle for Chatta- 
nooga was yet to be fought. Bragg had retired with delib- 
eration. He established his headquarters at Lafayette, behind 
Pigeon Mountains, but his rear guard never passed beyond 
Lee and Gordon's Mills. 

The news that Rosecrans' troops were in Chattanooga, and 
that he had pushed out after the retreating Bragg, made a 
tremendous impression upon the North. It was accepted as 
a capture, and a military occupation of that long-coveted 
stronghold. It is true it was occupied, but not in a military 
sense, since the Union army had not been brought into it, 
or concentrated between it and the enemy. 



1 



15 

Hence arose that misconception, which is widespread still, 
that the Array of the Cumberland had occupied Chattanooga, 
and thence marching out to attack Bragg, had been defeated 
by the latter at Chickamauga, and driven back in disorder 
into Chattanooga. 

But, instead, Chickamauga was the battle for Chattanooga, 
fought by Rosecrans while on the way to take military pos- 
session of it, and while he was concentrating his army be- 
tween Bragg and that city, the objective of the Union cam- 
paign. The battle was not for the Chickamauga woods, but 
for the passes behind them which controlled the way to Chat- 
tanooga. These were secured as the immediate result of the 
battle, and the successful occupatfon of Chattanooga in the 
militai-y sense followed — an occupation which lasted till the 
close of the war. 

Iti connection with the fact of Crittenden's unopposed 
movement into Chattanooga another point of general misap- 
prehension arose, which, through the years, has formed the 
basis of unfair and unthinking, if not ignorant criticism of 
General Rosecrans' brilliant strategy. Why did not Rose- 
crans face Thomas and McCook about in the valley west of 
Lookout, where their movements would have been concealed, 
and hurry them after Crittenden into Chattanooga? It was 
simply because with McCook's advance nearly fifty miles 
from Chattanooga by the roads west of Lookout, and Thomas's 
head of column already down and over Missionary Ridge, 
lull thirty miles away, to withdraw and send them in succes- 
sion after Crittenden would have been to have invited attack 
in detail from Bragg upon each head of column as it followed 
Crittenden, with all the chances in favor of Bragg's success. 
Besides, the shortest and surest, in fact the only practicable 
line of concentration looking to the safety of the widely- 
separated corps was through a movement to the left along 
the eastern basis of Lookout and Missionary Ridge. It was 
this movement of Rosecrans for concentrating on Crittenden's 
position south of Rossville that led to the battle of Chicka- 
mauga. Bragg, having been heavily re-enforced, started at 
the same time from Lafayette to interpose between Rosecrans 
and Chattanooga, the Union objective of the whole campaign. 

Subsequent letters will follow this exciting concentration, 
and the desperate contests of each army for position, and 
the bloody battles which ensued, and by which Chattanooga 
was finally won. 

H. V. B. 



Washington, August 7. — [_Special.'] — In the movements of 
the Union armies none, from first to last, presented such 
brilliant strategy as the two which brought General Rosecrans 
from Murfreesboro', to the rear of Chattanooga. Almost 
equally wonderful was the successful concentration of his 
widely scattered corps. This was accomplished in the face 
of an enemy that had been heavily re-enforced with veteran 
troops, and largely outnumbered General Rosecrans. The 
concentration, moreover, united the Army of the Cumber- 
land for battle between this confident enemy and the city 
which Avas the objective of, the Union forces. 

The story is crowded with brilliant and successful opera- 
tions of detached corps against greatly superior forces and of 
minor strategy, which blend harmoniously with the ir re 
striking features of the great campaign. It covers a period 
of intense anxiety for General Rosecrans and his subordinate 
commanders, of most skillful action, and continued danger to 
destruction in detail. It culimnated in the delivery of a bat- 
tle, which, through still widely misunderstood, unquestiona- 
bly ranks for the stubbornness and effectiveness of its fighting 
and the importance of its results witb the most notable bat- 
tles of the war. 

A previous letter left the Army of the Cumberland where 
its strategy had thrown it across three mountain ranges and 
the Tennessee River, and brought it without loss to the rear 
of Chattanooga, at the foot of the eastern base of the Lookout 
Mountains. This had compelled Bragg to withdraw toward 
Lafayette. The left of the Union army, under General Crit- 
tenden, had passed around the north end of Lookout, marched 
through Chattanooga after Bragg, and occupied Rossville 
Gap. General McCook, forty-two miles to the right, had 
descended to Alpine, while the center, under General 
Thomas, was at Steven's Gap, directly opposite Bragg's 
center, at Lafayette. 

Finding that the enemy had withdrawn behind Pigeon 
Mountains, General Rosecrans having been assured from 
Washington that no re-enforcements had been sent from Lee's 
army, determined to push Bragg vigorously at all points for 
the purpose of gaining every advantage which a retreat pre- 
sented, and of inflicting all the damage possible. Beyond 
question, this put his army in serious peril, since Bragg had 
only retired to meet re-enforcements promised and actually 
arriving from all quarters, and was even then concentrated 
and ready to strike. McCook, on the right, pushed in from 
Alpine and Summerville with Stanley's cavalry to within 




LAFAYETTE 



WHEELERS CAV. 






Stanley's c A V. 



SUMMERI^/LLE 

f 



ALPINE 



17 

seven miles of Lafayette without finding any signs of retreat. 
He therefore wisely kept his trains and main force near the 
mountain. 

Negley, of Thomas, marched out from Steven's Gap beyond 
the Chickamauga and his skirmishers deployed in front of 
Dug Gap. This advanced position he held during the 10th, 
and early next morning was supported in it by Baird's di- 
vision. Here Bragg attempted his initiative, and developed 
his preparations for advance. Two corps of infantry. Hill's 
and Walker's, a division from Polk's command, and a di- 
vision of cavalry, were in the gaps of Pigeon Mountains, or the 
woods behind them, under orders to advance on Negley. By 
a fortanate delay their combinations for attack were not com- 
pleted until Baird had arrived. The bold front displayed by 
both of these officers still further held back those overwhelm- 
ing forces of Bragg. When the latter were ready to move, 
the skill, sharp fighting, and able maneuvering under fire 
enabled these Union officers to bring their troops back to the 
shelter of the mountain with comparatively little loss. It 
was a thrilling and difficult situation, and the day a most 
anxious one for Generals Eosecrans and Thomas. 

The disappointment was great to Bragg when he learned 
that his heavy converging columns from Catlett's Gap on his 
right. Dug Gap in the center, anil Blue Bird Gap on his left 
had met on the ground held by Negley and Baird, only to find 
them retiring with such show of strength and with such well 
ordered lines as enabled them to elude even serious attack. 
Both these officers deserve far greater credit than they have 
ever received for their courage, coolness, and ability. At 
night they were supported by the arrival of Brannan and 
Keynolds from the west side of the mountain^ and the position 
of Thomas at Steven's Gap was secure. 

Rosecran's anxiety and Bragg's attention were instantly 
turned to the Union left. The discovery on the 11th that the 
rebel rear guard under Cheatham had not moved south of 
Lee & Gordon's showed Rosecrans that whatever Bragg's 
intention may have been, he was then concentrating for battle. 
As General Rosecrans himself declares in. his official report, 
the concentration of the Army of the Cumberland became a 
matter of life and death. 

Crittenden, from the 9th to the 12th, had carried on most 
vigorous operations. Palmer and Van Cleve had advanced 
to Ringgold. Wood was close at hand. Hazen, Minty, and 
Wilder, fresh from their part in the brilliant feint north of 
the river, had joined Crittenden, and some lively minor bat- 
tles were the result. The discovery that the rebel rear guard 
was still at Lee & Gordon's suddenly stopped these opera- 



18 

tions, and on the 12th., under an order to concentrate with 
the utmost celerity north of the Chickamauga, Crittenden 
established himself along that river near and above Lee & 
Gordon's. 

On the ISth Bragg had ordered an attack upon him by 
Polk with two corps and the promise of the support of a third, 
hoping to overthrow this wing, in continuance of his plan of 
defeating the Union corps in detail, before the center or right 
could afford relief. In the face of such threatening, with 
McCook over fifty miles away, and Thomas unable to move 
from the center till McCook should be within supporting dis- 
tance, Eosecrans undertook the concentration of his army. 

At this point, that justice may be done, it is well to contrast 
the attitude which the governments at Washington and Rich- 
mond had assumed toward this movement on the rebel center. 

For weeks before General Rosecrans had moved forward 
he had tried to impress upon the authorities at Washington 
the importance of giving him strong support. Promising 
offers to raise veteran mounted troops from several Eastern 
governors were laid before the War Department and refused 
with insulting warmth. Two weeks later came the order from 
Halleck to move at once and keep moving, which is treated 
of at length in a former letter. 

This gross ignorance at Washington of the gigantic diffi- 
culties of the situation was equaled, if not surpassed, by a 
telegram of September 11, the very day that Bragg's re-en- 
forced army was moving against Rosecrans' center and or- 
ganizing for an attack on his left, and while Rosecrans and 
Thomas and McCook were straining every nerve in a life and 
death effort to concentrate their army. Said Halleck, by 
telegraph of this date : 

"After holding the mountain passes on the west and 
Dalton, or some point on the railroad, to prevent the return 
of Bragg's army, it will be decided whether your army shall 
move further South into Georgia and Alabama. It is re- 
ported here that a part of Bragg's army is re-enforcing Lee. 
It is important that the truth of this should be ascertained 
as early as possible." 

This showed that Halleck shared the general and ignorant 
belief that Rosecrans had occupied Chattanooga in a military 
sense. 

At this time Longstreet's advance had been gone a week 
from under Halleck's eyes near Washington, and two divis- 
ions of Johnston's troops from Mississippi, and Buckner, 
from East Tennessee, had already joined Bragg, and others 
were on the way. 



19 

The failure to give Rosecrans effective flanking supports 
was inexcusable. The only explanation for it is found in the 
irritation and dislike which his straightforward and independ- 
ent dealings had aroused in Washington, and a failure to 
understand the natural obstacles of the position and the con- 
templated advance. Meade was in a state of enforced inactivity 
before Lee. Grant's army was doing nothing to occupy John- 
ston in Mississippi, and there was no such Union activity in 
front of Mobile and Charleston as prevented troops being 
spared to Bragg from those points. And so, while the 
Washington authorities were finding fault witli Rosecrans 
while he was pushing some of the most brilliant; and effec- 
tual moves of the war, and were not even lifting a finger to 
encourage or even to protect him, the Richmond government 
was neglecting no means to strengthen Bragg to the extent 
of its powers. As a result, in one week from the date of 
Halleck's telegram inquiring whether Bragg was re enforcing 
Lee, Longstreet and Johnston and Walker and Buckner 
had reached Bragg from the extremes of the Confederacy, 
and he had moved to attack Rosecrans with 70,000 men. 

In this criminal neglect of Rosecrans the authorities were 
without excuse. No friend of Stanton's or Halleck's hav^e 
even yet attempted to explain, much less defend it. These 
and other high officers, at one time or another, arraigned 
General Rosecrans as solely responsible for what they chose 
to designate as the disaster and defeat of Chicamauga. It 
was the shortest way for some of them to divert attention 
from the terrible neglect and responsibility which rested on 
their heads. But even if the favorable chances for the con- 
centration of Confederate forces against Rosecrans had escaped 
unwilling observation at Washington, the authorities there 
were without excuse, since the case was very pointedly placed 
before them in an editorial of the Cincinnati Commercial, 
which excited so much attention that the editor was officially 
notified that such articles were highly indiscreet. This was 
as early as September 1. In view of what occurred a few 
weeks later, and of the evidence it gives of ample warning, 
it is interesting to reproduce this editorial of Mr. Halstead, 
printed on the date named, under a title, a "Point of Dan- 
ger." Said the editor : 

"Jeff Davis and his generals are as well informed as we are 
of the presence of a considerable part of the army of the Po- 
tomac in New York City to enforce the draft, and that con- 
sequently an advance on Richmond need not be apprehended 
for some weeks. They have also heard of the presence of 
Admiral Farragut in New York, and infer from the circum- 
stance that there is no immediate danger of an attack on 



20 

Mobile. They know the situation at Charleston, and are not 
mistaken in the opinion that the advance upon that city 
must be slow, by process of engineering, digging, and heavy 
cannonading. They do not need large bodies of troops to 
make the defense ; negro laborers, engineer officers and gun- 
ners being all that are required. General Grant's army, as 
is well known, is, for the most part, resting from its labors 
in undisputed possession of an enormous territory. The real 
aggressive movement of the Federal forces is upon the rebel 
center ; that is to say, East Tennessee, and it is extremely 
unlikely that the rebels are deficient in information as to the 
strength and intentions of Generals Rosecrans and Burnside. 

" The important question is whether they will improve the 
opportunity by concentrating upon their center. The reports 
that General Joe Johnston has joined his forces to those re- 
cently under Bragg, and has thus gathered a force almost if 
not quite equal numerically to those in the hands of General 
Rosecrans, have in addition the immense advantages of the 
occupation of mountain passes, and that are to be found in 
pursuing a defensive system of warfare. General Lee is re- 
ported to have sent troops to East Tennessee, and it is prob- 
able that he has done so, as, thanks to the New York riots, he 
has some divisions temporarily to spare from Virginia. If 
the rebels do give up East Tenessee and Northern Georgia 
without a struggte, that is to say, if Generals Rosecrans and 
Burnside complete the operations in which they are engaged 
without meeting serious resistance, it may he taken as con- 
clusive evidence of the exhaustion of the rebellion." 

Several subsequent editorials enforced these ideas, and 
were even so definite as to point out Johston, Longstreet_, 
and Buckner as the commands which were likely to re-en- 
force Bragg. 

General Rosecrans had had these general points of danger 
in mind, and made them known to the Government nearly 
a month before he crossed the Tennessee. But his request 
for more men and flanking supports was refused at the War 
Department with much warmth and most inconsiderate em- 
phasis. This Commercial editorial, therefore, startled him, 
and his records show that he sent Mr. Halstead a sharp let- 
ter intimating that such an editorial was little better than 
a call to the Jeff Davis government to fall on him. It was, 
however, the clear common sense of the situation ; and if the 
Washington authorities had heeded it, instead as was their 
custom, sneering at "newspaper generals" and newspaper 
ways of carrying on the war, many lives would have been 
saved at Chickamauga which were lost because of the un- 
equal contest, and there would never have been any question- 
ing of that costly, but no less decided victory. 



% 



21 

It is further true that General Peck, stationed in North 
Carolina, sent word to General Rosecrans, under date of 
September 6, that Longstreet's corps was passing southward 
over the railroads. Colonel Jacques, of the Seventy-third 
Illinois, who had come up from the South, tried in vain for 
ten days to gain admittance in Washington, to communicate 
this fact of Longstreet's movement to Halleck and Stanton, 
and then, without accomplishing it, started West, and 
reached his command in time to fight with the regiment at 
Cbickamauga, There had been time enough, after General 
Eosecrans's explanations of his proposed plan, to force Burn- 
side, with twenty thousand men, down from East Tennessee, 
and to have brought all needed strength for the other flank 
from the Army of the Tennessee on the Mississippi. Even 
when ordered up, after the battle, this latter loitered to a 
degree that its commander will never be able to satisfactorily 
explain. 

To return from this digression, Bragg on the 13th had 
ordered an attack by three corps on Crittenden, The latter, 
by his great activity and by the bold operations of Van Cleve, 
Wood, Palmer, and the brigades of Hazen, Minty, and 
Wilder, had created the impression of much greater strength 
than they really had, and Polk moved cautiously. Finally, 
just as he was ready to attack, his column on the Lafayette 
road encountered Van Cleve moving on him with a single 
brigade of infantry. So vigorously did this officer attack 
that he forced Polk's advance back for three miles, and cre- 
ated the impression of a general Union advance. This dis- 
concerted Polk, and instead of ordering his forces forward, 
he halted, took up a defensive position, and sent to Bragg 
for re-enforcements. Thus Negley and Baird, by their pluck 
and skill in front of overwhelming forces, and Palmer and 
Crittenden's active divisions and attached brigades on the 
left, by their unhesitating attacks wherever they developed 
the enemy, and by this last one delivered in the face of an 
advance of three full corps on one, had made the concentra- 
tion of the army possible, and had saved it. The next day 
Steedman, that lion ot battle, had reached Rossville, in im- 
mediate support of Crittenden, with two brigades of his own 
command and two regiments and two batteries temporarily 
attached, having marched from Bridgeport, a distance of forty 
miles, in twenty-eight hours. 

The appearance and wonderful activity of Hazen, Wilder, 
and Minty's brigades on the left of Crittenden's, and Steed- 
man's forces of the reserve corps at Rossville, with the fact 
that McCook was nearing Thomas, and that the latter had 
extended his left to within near supporting distance of Critten- 



22 



aen, see. to ^a™ -trained Bra J„.att^^^^^ 

%rH„^'^4r,^p:r ^f -;i:a«Te^rJ;■ion a^ain. t„e 

During Y" P^"" ; "gji the concentration ot Ins 

Union front Rosecrans >°™J« understanding the 

:::i ir he'to'fol- the mSntiin, and not deemin, it 
prudent to^eonsume the time necessary to explore l«Y,'dav 
piuueut tu ,,„■„ „^ tVip cost ot more than a mil clay, 

"iSX .h, 1..I. 0. .1.. n.k *. I"" *»' »• 

^"^wS ''o^n^'thl m'orning of the 18th, the three corps of the 

""Tra'^'l^rdtr'tr' attack on the 18th could not bee.ec.l.d^ 
^otJ Narro^mlds, small bridges, diffi->V J-f ^'/the 

S:rt:.i:^fr^Tiif";:uronr^s^^ 

Tthe feb 1 rtit deianged Braggs's plan, and (breed h,,n 



ROSSt^lLLE G-AP 



STEEDM/4N 




MAP OF FIRST DAY'S BATTLE. 



23 

concentration, and which at the same time defeated Bragg's 
purpose to fight with the back of his own army to Chatta- 
nooga with a view to its recovery. 

The map given below will make this inversion and final 
concentration clear, and show the position of the two armies 
at daylight on the 19th, when the battle began. 

On the 17th G-eneral Thomas's corps was in the vicinity of 
Pond Spring, Negley on the left, and so nearest to a junction 
with Crittenden at Lee & Gordon's, Baird next to the right, 
and Brannan next. Reynolds was thrown to the front. The 
left of McCook had closed on Thomas at Fond Spring. 

During the day Bragg, strongly threatening Crittenden at 
Lee & Gordon's with two divisions, held him fast, and started 
the rest of his army down the Chickamauga to cross and 
sweep in on Crittenden's left and rear, expecting to find him 
still constituting the left of the Union army, and to double 
this left back on Thomas and McCook. 

Bushrod Johnson had crossed at Reed's Bridge, driven 
Wilder nearly to the State road at Vineyard's, and bivou- 
acked a mile and a half from Crittenden's left. Walker had 
also crossed at Lambert's Ford with three divisions and For- 
rest's cavalry division, and halted for the night about a mile 
in the rear of Hood. For the most part Bragg's army had 
the full night for rest. 

On the other hand, the Union columns were alive with 
motion. That night was to cover the inversion of an army. 
About 4 o'clock Thomas started his whole corps from Pond 
Spring toward Crittenden, McCook following him. This was 
doubtless interpreted by Bragg as a closing in on Crittenden. 
But it was far more than that. 

As soon as night shut the columns in they were pressed 
rapidly to the left. Negley, as he drew near to Crittenden, 
was moved to the Chickamauga in front of Crawfish Springs. 
This prevented a night attempt to cut the column by occupy- 
ing the roads intersecting at that point. Meantime Thomas, 
with his other three .divisions, pushed on. It was a long, 
weary night. Heavy trains of supplies and ammunition 
occupied the road. The troops moved mostly through the 
adjacent fields, both for celerity of marching and as guards 
to the trains. Heavy flanking forces streamed along parallel 
to the road, and well out toward the river. There were 
constant interruptions to continuous movement, causing fre- 
quent halts of the infantry. The night was cool, and, as 
the commands stopped, the men warmed themselves by start- 
ing fires in the fences. The result was that toward midnight 
the trains were everywhere driving between two continuous 
lines of fires, and the men on either side, or in the road, had 



24 

constant facilities for warming themselves. It was a tedious 
and most fatiguing night, but at daylight the vitally im- 
portant task was done. Thomas's head of column, Baird in 
advance, reached the Kelly farm at daylight, with Brannan 
well closed up and Reynolds a short distance in the rear. 
Brannan was on the State or Lafayette road, near the inter- 
section of the road leading into it from Reed's bridge, McCook 
had reached a point to the right and rear of Crittenden, near 
Crawfish Springs. And so at sunrise the Union right, in- 
stead of resting far up the Chickamauga from Crittenden's 
position, as Bragg expected to find it, had become the left of 
Rosecrans' army and Crittenden was the right. More than 
this, Rosecrans had established his lines two miles beyond 
Bragg's right, and between it and Chattanooga. The victory 
of concentration had been followed by the equally important 
success of inverting the army and thus thrusting its columns 
between the enemy and the objective of the campaign. These 
second stages of the movement deserve to take rank with the 
matchless strategy with which it was inaugurated.. 

But the battle for the firm and final possession of Chatta- 
nooga was still to come. It opened suddenly for both sides, 
and for Bragg in a wholly unexpected quarter. The weary 
Union troops had scarcely time to cook their coffee after the 
night march, and some of them no time at all, before the 
storm broke and the army was summoned to the battle which 
Thomas had opened. 

H. V. B. 



Washington, August 14. — [Special.] — The last letter in 
this series left the Army of the Cumberland on the morning 
of the 19th of September, concentrated for battle on the field 
of Chickamauga. By an energetic night march the army 
had been thrown forward on its left by inversion into line, 
and thrust between the enemy and Chattanooga, the objective 
of the campaign. It was a difficult and dangerous move- 
ment, where two armies, intent on battle, were only separated 
by such a stream as the Chickamauga, Avhich was everywhere 
easily fordable above Lee & Gordon's. But General Thomas, 
who led this column, is the one commander of a great army 
of whom it can be said with accuracy that from the first of 
the war to the close no movement of his miscarried. At day- 
light of the 19th he held the Lafayette and Chattanooga road 
at the Kelly farm. 

Bragg' s array, though re-enforced from all parts of the 
Confederacy, and though it had been well concentrated be- 
tween Lafayette and Gordon's mills for several preceding 
days, had been skillfully foiled by General Eosecrans in the 
efforts to strike his isolated corps. During the 18th it had 
been pressed by Bragg down the winding and thickly- 
wooded valley of the Chickamauga in execution of an order 
for battle. This order was based upon the idea that Critten- 
den's corps at Lee & Gordon's was the left of the Union 
army. While he was to be held there by strong force threat- 
ening attack from the other side of the stream^, the bulk of 
Bragg's army was to cross at the various fords and bridges 
below, and, turning up stream, was then to join in sweeping 
Crittenden back on Thomas and McCook, whom Bragg sup- 
posed still to constitute the Union center and right. In exe- 
cution of this plan Bushrod Johnson had crossed at Keed's 
bridge, and pushed up to within a mile and a half of Lee & 
Gordon's, and westward to within a mile of the Lafayette 
road, where night overtook him. Walker's corps had crossed 
below Alexander's Bridge, and bivouacked alter a short ad- 
vance toward Crittenden. Minty and Wilder, with their 
mounted men, and Dan McCook, with his brigade, had 
stoutly resisted and greatly delayed these columns. The most 
of Bragg's army had rested through the night. Two corps 
of Kosecrans's forces had mardied continuously since four 
o'clock the preceding afternoon. They were about to move 
into battle without time for breakfast or further rest. Bragg, 
upon Longstree't's arrival, would have 70,000 men available 
for the fight. Kosecrans's strength for battle was not over 
56,000. 



26 

At daylight all of Bragg's army, wholly concealed by the 
forests, was in motion. A considerable portion of it was still 
crossing the river at the various fords and bridges from Tel- 
ford's to Reed's bridge, and deploying on the other side to- 
ward Crittenden, who was still supposed to hold the Union left. 

Suddenly, about 9 o'clock, there came to Bragg's ears the 
sounds of heavy and unexpected battle far down the Chicka- 
mauga and well toward Rossville. Thomas, whose head of 
column rested at the Kelly farm, for the double purpose of 
exploring the forests in his front and to test the truth of a 
report that an isolated brigade of the enemy was on the west 
side of the river near Reed's bridge, moved Brannan and 
Baird directly into the forest on the road towards Reed's. At 
this time two-thirds of Bragg's army, concealed by the for- 
ests, had crossed the Chickamauga and was directing its col- 
umns up that stream toward Crittenden. Just at the time 
when Bragg expected that his right would have swung 
across the Lafayette road, and that his center divisions would 
have opened on Crittenden's position at Lee & Gordon's, 
these portentous sounds of battle from Thomas's line aston- 
ished and perplexed him. After vainly waiting for them 
to cease, under the first impression that the affair was a move- 
ment of his forces in reconnoissance, and that some Union 
cavalry had been encountered, he found it so serious as to de- 
range his whole plan of battle, and force him to meet an 
enemy who had turned his right. To do this he was obliged 
to move a portion of his troops that had not crossed the river 
down stream to Reed's. By the circuitous roads which they 
were obliged to travel, it required a march of six miles to 
reach the left of Thomas. 

This destruction of the rebel plan was due to Thomas 
o[)ening the battle with the divisions of Brannan and Baird 
ill the vicinity of Reed's bridge. At 6.30 o'clock Brannan left 
Kelly's, and moving north, turned in from the Lafayette 
road at McDaniel's toward Reed's. A quarter of a mile i'rom 
McDaniel's he deployed his division. Van Derveer was on 
the left, and thus became the left of the Union army. Con- 
nell's brigade was in the center, and Croxton on the right. 
In like manner Baird advanced with a front line of two bri- 
gades. King, with the regulars, was on the left, next to 
Brannan, and Scribner on the right of King, while Stark- 
weather marched by the flauk behind Scribner' s right. 

The last disposition was promptly made by Baird upon his 
discovering that the enemy was in strong force to his right. 

Thus while neither army was aware that the other was in 
heavy force in the woods which surrounded them, and wliile 
Bragg's forces were forming to move up the Chickamauga, and 



27 

so away from Thomas's line of march, both Brannan and Baird 
came in force on Bragg's right, in front of Reed's bridge, at 
a point near Jay's Mills, and opened the battle of Chicka- 
mauga. Croxton struck first with a vigorous attack on For- 
rest, who^ with the two divisions of his corps, was guarding 
the Confederate right. The cavalrymen were forced back to 
the sawmill, where they rallied, dismounted, and began to 
fight as infantry. Croxton held his own, and even ad- 
vanced slightly. Forrest sent for infantry, and Wilson's 
brigade of Walker's division hurried from Alexander's and 
rushed into the fight. 

Meantime re-enforcements were turning from all portions 
of Bragg's line toward the sound of furious battle. Shortly 
the advance toward Crittenden ceased, so vigorous had 
Thomas's battle become. Connell and Van Derveer at first 
meeting no enemy on their fronts pressed toward the vortex 
of Croxton's fighting. Forrest, relieved by Walker's infan- 
try, met this advance of Brannan's left with his whole force 
and fought for the most part on foot. Croxton, out of am- 
munition, was obliged to retire somewhat before Walker, 
when Baird pushed King in to support him, while Van Der- 
veer and Connell moved in first on Forrest and next on 
Ector's brigade of Walker's reserve. The battle became 
terrific. Forrest hurried in person after infantry supports, 
and for portions of his own command left near Alexander's. 

At 11 o'clock Bragg had become convinced that Rosecrans 
had forced battle upon him on the extreme rebel right. 
With such vigor did Thomas's two divisions fight that 
Walker was ordered at that hour to go to Forrest with all 
his force, and Cheatham, of Polk's corps, who had the 
strongest division of the army, consisting of five brigades, 
then stationed as the reserve of Bragg's left. Hardly had 
Cheatham started before Stewart, of Buckner's corps, which 
was near Tedford's Ford, ready to move toward Crittenden, 
was also dispatched in haste to the Confederate right, and 
at 1 o'clock Cleburne, of Hill's corps, posted near the ex- 
treme left of the Confederate line, was ordered to the scene 
of action before Brannan and Baird. These movements 
show how Bragg's plan of battle had been wholly over- 
turned, and how fierce the fighting of these two divisions 
of Thomas must have been to decide Bragg to send four 
infantry divisions to the assistance of Forrest's corps of two 
divisions. 

Meantime Walker had moved Govan's brigade obliquely 
on the right flank of Scribner and forced him back. Simul- 
taneously Walthall's brigade struck King in flank and drove 
him in disorder over Van Derveer's brigade. Guenther's 



28 

regular battery, one of the best and most efficient in the 
service, was captured. We shall see how it was shortl}'^ after 
retaken by the splendid Ninth Ohio. 

Thus, while Baird's lines were shaken by the overwhelm- 
ing; concentration against them, and Brannan was facing 
and fighting superior numbers, matters were hot for Thomas, 
who was slowly moving to and fro along his divisions and 
closely watching them. Baird was restoring his lines under 
fire and in the face of a flank attack Croxton's men, with 
fresh ammunition, were holding their place. Connell's bri- 
gade was immovable, and poured its fire into the very faces 
of the enemy. Van Derveer, on the left, was busily maneu- 
veiitig to meet flank attacks, and fighting desperately, but 
with unvarying success. 

At this moment, when Baird was scarcely able to maintain 
position, and must have soon yielded to numbers, Johnson, 
of McCook's corps, came on the field from Crawfish Springs, 
and was led by Thomas to the right of Baird. Here, with 
the brigades of Willich and Baldwin on the front and 
Dodge in reserve, Johnson, by heavy fighting, relieved the 
pressure on Baird, restored the line, and checked Bragg' s 
new center. 

Following came Palmer, most opportunely ordered for- 
ward by Crittenden from Lee & G-ordon's, who saw plainly 
from the development of furious battle on the Union left that 
troops would surely be wanted there. Palmer followed 
Johnson into line, and under the personal direction of 
Rosecrans the brigades of Hazen,Cruft, and Grose were formed 
in echelon and ordered forward, immediately encountering 
Cheatham's men and becoming fiercely engaged. Hazen on 
the left fell with great vigor on Walker's left and relieved 
Starkweather, of Baird, from precarious position. At the 
same time Van Derveer was thrown by Brannan on the right 
of Walker and by terrific fighting crushed Walthall's line 
and drove it well back into the forests. 

It was here that the Ninth Ohio, the German Turner reg- 
iment of Bob McCook — both regiment and commander of 
glorious memory — recaptured the regular battery and 
brought it into the Union lines. The regiment had been 
with the trains during the night march and it was chafing 
far in the rear when Van Derveer sent for it. Sore was his 
need. The repeated attacks of the enemy on his front and 
flank in the attempt to crush the Union left and reach the 
Lafayette road in its rear were becoming so frequent and 
heavy that, in spite of the fact that every man under him 
was fighting where he stood and yielding no inch of ground, 
it seemed as if the limit of human endurance even for iron 



I 



29 

veterans must soon be reached. Then from the near distance 
came the well-known hurrah of the Ninth advancing from 
the right. As all waited to welcome the head of its column, 
its charging shout was heard to the front of its line of ad- 
vance, followed at once by rapid musketry, and then their 
great "hurrah" of victory. The story is brief. Colonel 
Kammerling at the head of his regiment, coming on at dou- 
ble-quick, saw to his right and front the captured artillery of 
the regulars, just taken by Govan. Without order s he 
halted his line, fronted it, and with the command " Links 
Schwengket," swung it to the left, faced toward the hill 
where the battery stood in the hands of its captors, and 
with a sweeping charge drove the rebels back, bayoneting 
some among the guns, and rushed with guns and many pris- 
oners back to the Union line. A few minutes after he came 
in on the run to Van Derveer, just in time to take part in 
the last and supreme elFort of the enemy to crush that un- 
yielding left. Forrest's men had passed beyond Van Uer- 
veer's left and formed for assault on his front, and also di- 
rectly on his flank. But the vigilant skirmishers and pris- 
oners take-n by them made known the movement. The left 
was thrown back in time, and the line presenoed an obtuse 
angle opening toward the enemy. Into this, and heavily 
against the left of it, Forrest hurled his columns, four deep. 
On came these men in gray in magnificent Hues, which 
showed clearly through the open forest bending their faces 
before the sleet of the storm, and firing hotly as they ad- 
vanced. As they came within the range of the oblique fire 
from Van Derveer's right they halted within forty yards 
of his left and for a few moments poured in a destructive 
fire. A wheel of Smith's regular battery, and of a section 
of Church's guns which had reported, broughtthemw here they 
poured a nearly enfilading fire of cannister down those long 
lines, standing bravely there and fighting almost under the 
mouths ot the guns. Thomas and Braunan and Van Der- 
veer were looking on and encouraging the line. It had 
seemed almost beyond the probabilities to hold it till those 
well served batteries opened. An instant later it seemed as 
if the lines of gray had sunk into the earth. When the 
smoke lifted from the third round the front was clear of every- 
thing but the heaps of dead and wounded, and the work of 
the day at that point of the Union left was done. 

The fight still raged bitterly, however, along the lines of 
Johnson, and of Palmer to the right of him. Bran nan and 
Baird were withdrawn from the front which they had held, 
the former being sent toward the center to provideagainstcon- 
tiugencies there, and the latter posted to prevent any move- 



30 

ment toward the Layfayette road at McDaniel's. Forrest and 
Cheatham's brigades of infantry next attacked Johnson (of 
McCook), who then held the advanced portion of the Union 
left. Here the contest soon became furious again, partly on 
the ground of B'aird's morning battle. Maney's splendid bri- 
gade rushed to a hand-to-hand fight, but was borne back. 
Wright, Strahl, Jackson, and Smith, with their brigades, 
all under Cheatham, each delivered bold and most cour- 
ageous attacks^ but without carrying the Union line. Rose- 
crans's army, under the successive hammering of the Con- 
federate onslaughts, was fast being solidly formed from left 
to right. Willich, Baldwin, and Dodge, of Johnson, and 
Hazen, Cruft, and Grose, of Palmer, were fairly aligned, 
having fought themselves forward into good positions. 

The battle next fell heavily on the right of Palmer, as 
Bragg at last had his whole army in rapid motion toward 
his right. As Palmer's ammunition began to fail, Reynolds 
moved up to his right and rear, and made most excellent 
dispositions just east of the Lafayette road. Upon call, he 
pushed Willich and Edward King in on Palmer's right, and 
at once became hotly engaged. Crittenden sent Van Cleve 
with Samuel Beatty's and Dick's brigades to the right of 
Reynold's, leaving Barnes's brigade with General Wood at 
Lee & Gordon's. 

As fast as the Union line could be extended to the left it 
became sorely pressed by Bragg's troops, then well massed 
west of the Chickamauga. General Davis, from McCook, 
pressed rapidly to the left and was sent in near Vineyard's. 
At 3 o'clock Wood was ordered from Lee & Gordon's to the 
field of the growing fight. As Bragg still had some forces 
opposite this point. General Lytle's brigade, of Sheridan's 
division, was directed to relieve Wood and hold the crossing. 
Thus in six hours from the time Bragg was directing his 
army on Crittenden at Lee & Gordon's, a single brigade, 
posted there only from prudence, served for all demands 
against Confederate movement from that direction. This in- 
dicates how completely Bragg had been driven from his plan. 

Wood and Davis had not been dispatched a moment too 
J.OOU. Van Cleve, Davis, and Wood were confronted with 
solid masses of Bragg's concentrated troops, and the scenes 
and splendid fighting of the morning at the left were re- 
peated hereby these divisions. Stewart, Johnson, and Pres- 
ton, of Buckner's corps, and Hindmau, of Longstreet's 
advance, were assaulting these lines. Davis had been 
ordered to wheel in on the enemy's left flank, and this 
movement led to one of the bravest and bloodiest contests 
of the day in front of Vineyard's. Wood advanced his 



31 

lines into the vortex just when David was hardest pressed, 
and, when all seemed about to be compelled to yield, Sheri- 
dan appeared on the flank, and Wilder's mounted brigade 
came up in the rear. Every division of the Union army was 
in line except the reserve under Granger, which was some 
miles away toward Kinggold, with orders to hold Red House 
bridge. 

The battle along Rosecrans's center and right waxed hotter 
and fiercer. He seemed everywhere present and he was 
everywhere alert. Van Cleve encountered the left of Stewart 
marching to relieve Cheatham, and a fight muzzle to muzzle 
took place between Clayton of Stewart's and the two brigades 
of Van Cleve, Sam Beatty and Dick. 

Reynolds, by magnificent generalship and fighting, re- 
stored the broken line in his front, and firmly established 
himself there. His brigades, under Turchin and Edward 
King, covered themselves with laurels as they swayed back 
and forth on the tides of battles which rushed and swirled 
over all that portion of the field. 

Davis, with the brigades of Carlin and Heg, delivered their 
fire at short range, and stood their ground long and well, 
till borne back by overwhelming forces. It was just as this 
slow retrograde movement began that Wood had appeared, 
having marched rapidly from Lee and Gordon's with Hark- 
er's and Buell's brigade of his own division and Barnes's of 
Van Cleve's. They swept in on the right, and by splendid 
fighting checked the rebel line and held it on their front in 
spite of its vigorous and splendid fighting. 

At this point two exactly opposite movements were in 
progress along the lines of the armies, Bragg, who seemed 
determined to push his right between the Union left and 
Chattanooga, ordered Cleburne from Tedford's Ford to the 
extreme right, the scene of the morning fighting. At the 
same time General Thomas, convinced that no perilous attack 
could be delivered at that hour from that extreme point, was 
bringing Brannan from the left to the support of Reynolds 
just as the latter was fighting to push the enemy from the 
Lafayette road. Brannan arrived in time to help, and with 
Croxton's assistance Reynolds restored the lines on his front 
and flank, and regained possession of the road, Negley also 
iirrived opportunely from the right and took active part at 
this point. Wood repulsed Bushrod Johnson's division, 
though at great cost. Trigg, of Preston's division, entirely 
Iresh, moved in with splendid pluck and movement to restore 
the line, but Sheridan, from McCook, with Bradley and 
Laiboldt's brigades, met and checked this advance, and with 
its recoil the heat of battle on the Union right began to subside. 



32 

About 5 o'clock the field on both sides was still. But 
Cleburne and Walker were moving again far on the rebel 
right, in obedience to Bragg's order to again attack the Union 
left. The Confederate march was over the field of the morn- 
ing, where the dead of Walker were thickly strewed. It 
was a depressing advance. Still those veterans formed and 
moved on without a sign of shrinking, and about six o'clock 
the hour of silence was broken by a terrifie attack in the 
gathering dusk upon Johnson, near the ground occupied by 
Baird in the morning. The assault fell also upon Baird fur- 
ther to the left. Cleburne, with a front of a mile, filled by 
three brigades, had suddenly burst upon Thomas's left. 
Cleburne had three brigades — Polk, Wood, and Deshler. 
Walthall and Govan, of Liddell's division, and three brigades 
of Cleburne — Strahl, Johnson, and Preston Smith — supported 
him. The assault was tremendous. Night was falling, and 
the aim of each side was directed by the flashes of the guns. 

Willich, Dodge and Baldwin, of Johnson, fought their 
brigades with undaunted pluck and endurance. Baldwin fell 
on his line. Baird, with Scribner, King, and Starkweathar, 
held their ground, though vigorously attacked. Preston 
Smith, on the Confederate side, was killed here. Darkness 
put an end to the movement and the fighting, and each 
army sought rest. 

For the commanders of all grades it was a busy night. 
While the Union line was continuous and measurably com- 
pact between the enemy and practicable roads to Chatta- 
nooga, there was much realignment to be done to better the 
position for the morrow. The Union troops obtained only 
snatches of rest on ground white with frost. No fires were 
lighted, lest the direction of the lines might be revealed. 
This made supper a dry meal. But the fact that for most 
there had been no time for breakfast and none at all for 
dinner, gave excellent relish even to a dry supper. 

Rosecrans's purpose of establishing his lines between the 
enemy and Chattanooga had been accomplished. Bragg's 
plan of thrusting his army between the Union advance and 
the city had been defeated. At the close of this first day 
victory rested with Rosecrans. He had found himself largely 
outnumbered, and had thrown every available man into the 
fight. 

Bragg had many brigades which were not engaged, and 
Longstreet, with the greater part of his force, was yet to ar- 
rive. The spirit of the Union army had risen to a high pitch 
. under the splendid and most effective fighting which it had 
done, and it looked forward to the morrow with a confidence 
born of the consciousness of fighting and staying powers. 



33 

But hard as the work of the day had been, and stubborn 
and bitter as was the fighting in each army, the coming 
Sunday was to witness a battle eclipsing this and surpassing 
all the war for its pluck and deadliness. While the weary 
commanders were preparing for this day, and tired sentinels 
kept faithful watch, the wounded suffered and the armies 
slept. 

H. V. B. 



Washington, August 17. — [Special.] — The second and final 
fight for the possession of Chattanooga opened on Sunday, 
September 20. We have seen how through the preceding 
day, in the white heat of battle, the Union lines had estab- 
lished themselves on the field of Chickamauga, and that at 
nightfall they were still between Bragg and the city for which 
they were fighting. 

It was a cool and beautiful morning, though heavy fog 
hung over the lower parts of the field, greatly impeding the 
preparations of each commander. For an hour or two after 
daylight there were few indications of the terrific scenes which 
were to be crowded into that Sabbath day. 

Both sides had improved the night to rectify and strengthen 
the alignment. Bragg had received important re-enforoe- 
ments. General Longstreet arrived in the night and was 
placed in command of the left wing. Polk was assigned to 
the right wing. With Longstreet came the bulk of his two 
divisions from Virginia, Hood and McLaws. Three brigades 
only of the former had taken part with Hood in the first day's 
fight. Gist's brigade of Walker's corps also arrived from 
Meridian. The Army of the Tennessee, with all the warn- 
ings and requests of Rosecrans to the authorities at Wash- 
ington, had done nothing to prevent a general exodus of 
rebel forces from Mississippi. Even a portion of Pemberton's 
paroled men came, and two brigades, relieved by paroled 
prisoners, were in time for the first day's battle. Bragg re- 
adjusted his lineg during the night. The most important 
change was to bring Breckinridge from his extreme left, east 
of the Chickamauga, to the extreme right. Cleburne and 
Cheatham were both moved close to Breckinridge. Forrest, 
with two divisions, one to fight on foot, was placed still to 
the right of Breckrinridge, to observe the Lafayette road. 
With this heavy force, strengthened on its extreme left with 
Stewart, he intended to attack the Union left at daylight. 

Rosecrans, on the other hand, had no re-enforcements with 
which to relieve or help his lines, and most of his army had 
marched a night and fought a day without rest and with little 
food, and every available man had been engaged. Burnside 
had been for weeks where he could easily have formed a junc- 
tion. In fact, slowly as he had moved, his infantry had 
reached Kingston about the time Rosecrans had finished con- 
centrating his army. It was the duty and the business of 
Halleck and others at Washington to have had it on the field 
for the first day's battle. • 

It was grim business for this contracted line of Union 
heroes to face the eleven divisions of infantry and two of 



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35 

cavalry, one of the latter fighting as infantry, which Bragg 
had before them. Their only advantage was in their shorter 
lines and the fact that it was necessary for Bragg to attack, 
while for the most part they could remain on the defensive. 
They were besides in excellent spirits and confident of their 
powers. 

A glance at the map will show the rearrangement of the 
Union line. Beginning on the left, which covered Bragg's 
objective — namely, the control of the Lafiayette road to Chat- 
tanooga — Baird, Johnson, Palmer, and Reynolds were with- 
drawn slightly from the ground on which they had fought 
the day before, and placed in strong position in the edge of 
the woods which skirted the Kelly farm. Brannan remained 
near the position to which he had been called to support Rey- 
nolds the night before. The divisions of Negley, Wood, 
Davis, and Sheridan and the brigade of Wilder had all been 
drawn back of the Lafayette road, their lines being slightly 
advanced from the road, leading from Crawfish Springs to 
the Layfayette road at Kelly's farm. 

• The order of the Confederate line from its right to a point 
in front of Brannan's has already been stated. Here Stewart, 
of Buckner's corps, formed the right of Longstreet, who com- 
manded the left wing, and, counting toward the enemy's 
left, the succeeding divisions were Bushrod Johnson, with 
Law and Kershaw in reserve, Hindman and Preston Buck- 
ner's corps was present with this wing by the courtesy of 
Burnside and the Washington autliorities, while the latter 
alone were responsible for the inaction at the East which 
allowed Longstreets corps to be present. By the same court- 
esy Walker's division from Mississippi was present with 
Hill's corps, and was to fight again, splendidly but unsuccess- 
fully, on Bragg's right, as it had all the day before. 

Under cover the fog in the shelter of the woods, and in 
the plainful quiet of that Sabbath morning, the two armies 
had brought their lines face to face. At 9 o'clock there was 
scarcely any point the length of a tiger's spring between 
them. 

Bragg had 212 regiments, organized into 42 brigades, and 
these in 7 divisions. There were in all 173 infantry regi- 
ments and 11 of cavalry, which were dismounted and fought 
as infantry, 28 cavalry regiments and 50 batteries. Rose- 
crans had 158 regiments, 33 brigades, 14 divisions, and 5 
corps. There were 141 regiments of infantry and 18 of cav- 
alry and 36 batteries. 

Of Bragg's corps two were cavalry — Wheeler and Forrest. 
One division of Forrest's fought as infantry. Rosecrans had 
one cavalry corps of two divisions. This tremendous array 



36 

was pushed close against a Union front of only two miles and 
a half. 

At 9 o'clock that Sabbath service of all the gods'of war 
began. It broke full-toned with its infernal music over the 
Union left, and that morning service continued there till 
noon. 

Let us look a moment at the Union line. John Beatty's 
brigade had been stretched as a thin line from Baird's left 
to the Lafayette road and across it. King's regulars formed 
the left of Baird, Scribner his center, and Starkweather his 
right. He had no reserve. Johnston's division was on the 
right of Baird; Dodge and Baldwin, of his brigades, on the 
front, and Willich in reserve. Next was Palmer, with Cruft 
and Hazen on the line, and Grose in reserve. Reynolds, on 
Palmer's right, reached the Lafayette road again. He had 
Turchin in line and King in reserve. The Union line was 
protected by log barricades. It thus ran around the Kelley 
farm and was established i'rom fifty to a hundred yards within 
the woods which skirted the great open space in their 
rear. This field, which lay along the State road for half a 
mile and was a quarter of a mile wide, became the scene of 
almost continuous and ever brilliant fighting. Beside the 
great battle along the main lines surrounding it, there were 
during the day five distinct brigade charges over it, one of 
Stanley, one of Van Deveer, one of Grose, a fourth by Wil- 
lich, and a fifth by Turchin. 

Bragg 's orders were to attack successively by divisions, 
from right to left. Breckenridge struck first. He came on 
in single line, swinging around towards the State road to 
gain Baird's rear. Adams was on his right, Stovall in the 
center, and Helm on the left. This latter brigade struck 
Scribner's breastworks, and was instantly shattered there. 
Helm rode bravely among his troops, enthusiastically urging 
them forward, and fell dead while thus engaged. Two of 
his colonels were killed, and two were wounded. 

Stovall pushed in with dauntless pluck against the regu- 
lars on the left of Scribner, but King's men fought splen- 
didly. The rebels assaulted bravely but uselessly. Adams 
had swept in on John Beatty's thin line, and broken it. 
Still it fought with undaunted courage, yielding doggedly, and 
by the inch, and finally Adams, retarded by the disaster on 
his left, was at bay. At this juncture came Stanley's brigade, 
from Negley, near the center, with deployed lines, and the 
sun on its banners. It swept over the Kelly field, from 
near the house, and plunged into the woods in the rear of 
Beatty. Well might those who were witnessing that threat- 
ening move toward the Union rear hold their breaths as 



J 



37 

Stanley disappeared, and thus wait for his volleys and their 
effect. In a moment they came, then his rattling line fire, 
then the cheer of a charge. The first attack of Breckenridge 
had ended in a sore defeat. 

But Cleburne had in turn advanced. He, like Breckin- 
ridge, came in single line. Polk, of Cleburne, assaulted 
Starkweather's front, while Wood of the same command ex- 
tended the attack as far as the right of Baldwin. The rem- 
nants of Helm, under Colonel Lewis, still assisted against 
Scribner, but soon Cleburne's division was repelled at every 
point with terrible loss. The Confederate officers engaged 
describe the effect of the Union artillery throughout this at- 
tack as the most destructive in their experience. Thus 
Bragg's first attack had wholly failed. The Union forces 
were exultant, and so strong were their skirmish demonstra- 
tions that Hill, who was under orders to organize a second 
and much stronger attack, paused to first prepare his own 
lines against assault. 

Walker's reserve corps of two divisions was brought up, 
and its five brigades distributed along the shattered points 
of Breckenridge's and Cleburne's lines. The organizations 
of rebel divisions being thus destroyed, the attack became 
largely one of brigades acting independently, each rushing 
at the Union works. There were ten rebel brigades engaged 
in the movement from the Union left to Palmer's position, 
and beyond this point Stewart's division co-operated by as- 
saulting Reynold's narrow front and Brannan's lines. 
Wood, of Cleburne, who had previously stormed the angle 
of the Union works on Johnson's right and been repulsed, 
assisted by Deshler, of the same division, thinking this angle 
the flank of the barricades, again struck obliquely and with 
fury with the idea of turning them. Instead, these dashing 
Confederates went to pieces on Baldwin's brigade, of Johnson, 
and on Palmer's front. Walthall assaulted the corresponding 
angle at Scribner's position, and though he carried his men 
within pistol range of the crests, he was beaten back with 
heavy loss. Gist, acting with Helm's (now Lewis') broken 
line, attacked with power, but in turn was driven back. Col- 
quitt, still further to the right, came upon the regular brig- 
ade of King. But his line had missed direction, and was at 
onceexposed to a withering flank fire, and overwhelmed. Col- 
quitt fell. Several of his most prominent officers were killed. 
Ector and Wilson, of Walker's second division (Liddell's), 
advanced to help, but without effect. Govan, however, nf this 
same division , was successful , and by hot fighting and the weight 
of numbers, he bore back John Beatty's weakened line, and 
the situation on the Union left became at once most serious. 



38 

Everything but this along the line of the second attack by 
Bragg's right had failed. It began to look as if rebel victory 
was dawning here, and that the triumph of Bragg's plan of 
turning the Union left had come. 

For Breckinridge, in the second advance, had swung his 
lines much farther to his right, and by a wide left wheel had 
brought his right across the State road, and so between the 
Union left and Rossville. His left reached and slightly over- 
lapped Beatty's left. Thus formed with lines perpendicular 
to the State road, he began a march directly toward the 
Kelly house and the rear of Reynolds, just beyond it. 
While the remnants of the left, so badly broken, first under 
Helm and then under his successor, were entangled with 
Beatty and Stanley, his two other brigades, Adams on the 
right and Stoval to the left, burst out of the woods on the 
noth side of the Kelly field, quickly rectified their lines, 
threw out a heavy skirmish force, and bore rapidly down 
toward Reynolds. It was half a mile to his position over 
smooth and open ground. From the start the skirmishers 
could throw their bullets into Reynolds rear. It was a 
movement threatening dire disaster. The moment it devel- 
oped in the rear of Baird, Walker's corps and Cleburne's 
brigades reopened their fire on the front of the barricades, 
while Stewart advanced on Reynolds and Brannau. Thus, 
taken on flank, front, and full in the rear, and outnumbered 
at every point, it seemed as if there was no salvation for the 
Union left. But it came, and at that point wliere Confed- 
erate victory seemed sure, full defeat fell suddenly upon 
them. Thomas watching the progress of Breckinridge's 
flank attack, had sent to Rosecrans for Brannan. At that 
moment the battle had not extended to the latter. But just 
as Rosecrans' order to go to Thomas reached Brannan signs 
of heavy and immediate attack on his front became apparent 
He well used his discretion, and remained on the line until 
he could report the situation to Rosecrans. But in the 
mean time, in partial compliance with the order, he sent 
Fred Van Derveer's brigade, which constituted his reserve, 
to the help of the left. This brigade deployed, marched 
rapidly in to line toward the Kelly house, and came into 
the field less than two hundred yards in advance of Breckin- 
ridge's line. Though presenting its flank to the enemy 
when he was first discovered, it changed front in the open 
ground under fire, charged the rebel line, broke it, following 
it back into the woods, and after an hours' fighting drove 
these two brigades with their artillery entirely clear of the 
Union left. It then returned to a point near the Kelly 
house. y 



39 

Govan, of Walker, next on the left of Breckinridge^ had, 
however, gained a lodgment on the line which Beatty had 
so stubbornly held. Then came another Union charge over 
the Kelly field. Palmer, under Thomas's orders, sent 
Grose with his reserve brigade to clear Baird's immediate 
left. Moving from the edge of the woods back into the open 
field, Grose formed in double lines, moved at double-quick 
across the rear of Johnson and Baird, and rushed with 
cheers into the woods on the north side of the field. In a 
few moments his volleys were pouring into the face of Govan. 
The latter's troops fought desperately, but their supports on 
each flank had been previously broken, and soon, after bit- 
ter loss, gave way. The Union left was then further 
strengthened by placing Barnes, of Van Cleve, on the left of 
Beatty. It was then noon. So badly shattered was Bragg's 
right that it was nearly 5 o'clock before another attack 
could be organized on this ground. Thenceforth the Union 
left was safe. 

Simultaneously with the appearance of Breckinridge in 
the Kelly field events were hastening to an appalling con- 
summation on the Union center. Stewart, the right of 
Longstreet's wing, moved to the assault in Reynold's front. 
With three brigades he rushed upon Turchin^ who formed 
Reynold's advance, and Hazen, of Palmer, next on the left, 
while his left also involved Brannan's left. On his right he 
also had the co-operation of Wood's and Deshler's brigades, 
of Cleburne. Deshler was killed as the movement began, 
and Roger Q. Mills, of Texas, succeeded him. 

As this was the opening of the memorable attack which 
led to the break in the Union center it is worthy of close at- 
tention. General Stewart, in his report, thus describes it : 

'' For several hundred yards both lines pressed on under 
the most terrific fire it has ever been my fortune to witness. 
The enemy retired, and our men, though mowed down at 
every step, rushed on at double-quick, until at length the 
brigade on the right of Brown broke in confusion, exposing 
him to an enfilading fire. He continued on, however, some 
fifty to seventy-five yards further, when his two right regi- 
ments gave way in disorder and retired to their original po- 
sition. His center and left, however, followed by the gal- 
lant Clayton and indomitable Bate, pressed on, passing the 
cornfield in front of the burnt house, and to a distance of 
two hundred to three hundred yards beyond the Chattanooga 
road, driving the enemy within his line of intrenchments 
and passing a battery of four guns, which were afterward 
taken possession of by a regiment from another division. 
Here new batteries being opened by the enemy on our front 



40 

and flank, heavily supported by infantry, it became necessary 
to retire, the command reforming on the ground occupied be- 
fore the advance." 

All this was going on in the front of Reynolds and Palmer, 
while Brechinridge, as already described, was entering the 
open field from the north in plain sight from their rear. Yet 
not a single Union soldier left the line. Standing steadfast, 
they first resisted, as Stewart describes, and then were in- 
cited to still greater action by the brilliant fighting of Van 
Derveer in their rear, which so unexpectly brought them the 
much-needed relief. 

Here the story reaches the event of the break in the Union 
lines, which is widely misunderstood, and has been most un- 
justly used to throw discredit on General Rosecrans. Just 
as Longstreet's attack was developing upon Wood's front, 
the latter received an order from General Rosecrans to 
" close upon Reynolds as fast as possible and support him." 
As Brannan was between himself and Reynolds, Wood saw 
no other way of executing the order, which he deemed im- 
perative, except to withdraw from line, and pass to the rear 
of Brannan. This he did, although the attack was just 
bursting on his front. 

It lias been persistently claimed, to General Rosecrans's 
detrimeat, that in the excitement of the height of battle he 
had issued a blundering order. Nothing could be more un- 
just. The explanation is perfectly simple. General Thomas 
had sent for Brannan to meet Breckinridge's flank attack. 
Stewart's attack had struck Reynolds with force and was 
rapidly developing on Brannan's front. The latter hastily 
consulted with Reynolds as to the propriety of withdrawing, 
and both being clear that to obey the order would open the 
line to the enemy, Brannan dispatched Van Derveer, his re- 
serve, to the left, in partial compliance with its terms, and 
then reported to Rosecrans that he had deemed it vitally im- 
portant to maintain his line till the commanding officer 
could be advised of" the situation. He instantly approved 
Brannan's action. But just before his message arrived, 
upon the supposition that he had obeyed the order and gone 
to Thomas, the noted order to Wood to close to the left on 
Reynolds had been dispatched. When it reached Wood, the 
attack, rolling along Brannan's front, had reached his own. 
Had he exercised the same discretion which Brannan had so 
wisely displayed, all would have been well, and that nearly 
fatal break in the Union lines would not have occured. But 
instantly on reading it. Wood rapidly withdrew his division 
and started in the rear of Brannan toward Reynolds. Long- 
street, who had waited most impatiently till 11 o'clock be- 



41 

fore he could move a man to tlie attack, had solidified his 
lines before the Union center and left, and the moment 
Wood left this wide gap for him, Longstreet thrust into it 
the eight brigades of his central column of attack. They 
were formed in three lines, and advancing rapidly they 
opened on Brannan's right and rear and Davis' left, and 
greatly widened the gap. Brannan threw back his right, 
losing something from Connell's brigade on that flank, but, 
stubbornly resisting Longstreet's advance as he retired that 
wing of his division, he soon re-established it on Horseshoe 
Ridge, near the Snodgrass House, on a line nearly perpen- 
dicular to the one he had occupied when Longstreet pushed 
through the gap left by wood. The latter had passed rap- 
idly to the rear of Brannan, and though subjected to heavy 
attack after passing Brannan's left, he was able to establish 
his line on a lower ridge in the prolongation of Brannan's 
new position, and reaching in the direction of Reynolds. 
The latter officer soon retired his right slightly, and the line 
was again continuous, except a break between Wood and Rey- 
nolds, from Brannan's right to Barnes on Baird's left. 
Into this vacant space Hazen moved later under orders from 
Thomas, and then the line on that part of the field was 
•firmly established. 

All to the right of Brannan had gone. Negley, with one 
brigade of his division, which was caught in the gap, had 
drifted toward Brannan. Here, gathering up much artillery, 
which he was ordered by Thomas to post on the crest over- 
looking the field in front of Baird's left, he took it instead to 
Brannan's right, and soon, without waiting to be attacked 
in his strong position, and although he had promised Bran- 
nan to hold it, abandoned it, and retired in haste toward Ross- 
ville, ordering all the artillery to follow him. 

Davis had moved rapidly into the breastworks which Neg- 
ley had occupied, and there placed his weak force of two 
brigades across Longstreet's advance. But after his terrific 
fighting of the day before he had only twelve hundred men for 
action, and though Garlin. and Heg's men under Martin, 
fought with desperation, they could do nothing but yield. 
They were driven in disorder to the right and rear. 

At the same time Yan Cleve, with his two remaining 
brigades in motion towards Thomas, was thrown into great 
disorder, through a considerable portion of them rallied with 
Wood . 

As Davis was borne back, McCook, of the Twentieth Corps, 
in person led Laibolt's brigade, of Sheridan's division, 
against Longstreets' advancing columns. The attack was 
delivered with spirit and power, but it flailed in the face of 



42 

overwhelming numbers, and the brigade was utterly routed. 
McCook was carried to the rear with it. 

Next came Sheridan, with his two remaining brigades un- 
der Lytle and Bradley. The former, with splendid bearing 
and courage, rallied his columns, and though they were taken 
at every disadvantage, under the inspiration which be im- 
parted they faced the resistless advance with desperate valor. 
Lytle fell where death was thickest for his comrades. His 
brigade, and that of Bradley, with Wilder, who bad also 
fought to the extremity to assist, were all borne to the rear 
and forced to join the fugitive columns falling off from the 
Union right toward Rossville. General Rosecrans had just 
ridden tlie lines from the left, and had passed in the rear of 
McCook's position, when the line was severed. Finding the 
roads in rear of the right filled with retreating columns rep- 
resenting all corps of the army, for Negley was there from 
Thomas, he deemed it prudent to ride to Chattanooga and 
decide upon a new position in front of the place. General 
Crittenden's whole command, that is, three divisions, having 
been ordered in succession to Thomas before the break, Crit- 
tenden himself, being without command, rode into Chatta- 
nooga after Rosecrans, as did also McCook. Sheridan's divis- 
ion was in good order by the time it reached Rossville, and 
most of the troops which left the field were about tliat place 
and McFarland's Gap in fighting condition throughout the 
afternoon. Their numbers at 2 o'clock were from seven to 
ten thousand. They could easily have been led to Baird's 
left or Brannan's right, as the way to either flank was open. 
This was proved by the fact that General Garfield, Colonel 
Gates Thurston, and Surgeons Gross and Perkins, the medi- 
cal directors of the Fourteenth and Twentieth Corps, rode 
back and joined General Thomas. It is one of the myths of 
current Chickamauga history that Sheridan marched with his 
division back to the fighting line, but this is an error. He 
received a request at McFarland's Gap from Gen. Thomas 
to return to the field, but decided instead to retire to Ross- 
ville. Upon reaching the latter point he moved out on the 
Lafayette road toward Gen. Thomas, but did not form a 
junction with him. He reached the Cloud House at 7 p. m. 
and soon after withdrew to Rossville. 

Six Confederate divisions under Longstreet had taken part in 
breaking the Union center and sweeping its right off the field. 
These were Stewart, Bushrod Johnson, and Prestcm, of 
Buckner's corps : Hood and McLaws, of Longstreet's Vir- 
ginia troops, and Hindman's division of Folk's corps. Eight 
brigades of this force had first entered the gap left by Wood, 
and from that time till Rosecrans, McCook, Crittenden, and 



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KELLEYS FARM-HORSESHOE RIDGE. 



43 

Sheridan had gone, and Brannan had established himself on 
Horseshoe Ridge, each of these six divisions had advanced 
and fought with vigor. Finally Hindman, finding no re- 
sistance on his left, wheeled to the right to assist Longstreet's 
center and right, which had been checked by Brannan and 
Wood. This brought Longstreet's six divisions together in 
the vicinity of Horseshoe ridge. 

Shortly after 2 o'clock Longstreet ordered a general as- 
sault by his wing. It was delivered with confidence and 
tremendous power. To meet these six divisions Brannan on 
the right had Croxton's brigade and part of Connell's ; Wood, 
on the left, had Harker's brigade. With these organized 
commands were a part of John Beatty's, a good part of Stan- 
ley's and the Twenty-first Ohio, of Sirwell's, all of Negley ; 
parts of the Ninth and the Seventeenth Kentucky ; Forty- 
fourth Indiana and Thirteenth Ohio, of Van Cleve's divis- 
ion, with the Fifty-eighth Indiana, of Buell's brigade — in 
all about 4,000 men. 

Against this line, hastily formed and without reserves, 
Longstreet launched his solid columns. They came on mag- 
nificently, wave behind wave. They met sheeted fire from 
the summits, and yet pressed on to hand encounters, but from 
these they soon recoiled. The whole line retired from the 
foot of the slopes, and covered by the forests organized for a 
second attack. It was delivered soon alter 3 o'clock. Like 
the first, it fell on the fronts of Wood and Brannan. But 
while Hindman assaulted the latter in front he also sent 
a brigade through the gap to Brannan's right to scale 
the ridge and gain his rear. Negley, who had held this 
point with abundant artillery and infantry supports, and 
who had promised to stay there, had promptly fled before 
any attack had reached him and was even then in Rossville. 
There was absolutely nothing to send against Hindman's 
left, towering there with its fringe of bayonets on the com- 
manding ridge, and forming to sweep down on Brannan's 
right and rear. Longstreet and all his general officers were 
exultant, and though their second attack had failed every- 
where, except as this lodgment was obtained on the ridge 
beyond Brannan, they rapidly arranged their lines for what 
they believed would be a final assault leading to sure victory. 

But not a Union soldier moved from his place. The men 
clutched their guns tighter. Officers everywhere moved 
closer to the lines to encourage and steady them. The color- 
bearers set their flags firmer. And then, as if to repay such 
courage, help came as unexpectedly as if the hand of the 
Lord had been visibly extended to save. Suddenly a Union 
column appeared, moving with speed across the fields from 



44 

the direction of the McDanie] house. It was G-ranger, of the 
reserve, with two brigades of Steedman's division. Being 
stationed four miles away toward Ringgold, Granger, agree- 
ing with Steedman that they must be sorely needed on the 
field, had started without orders, and though shelled by 
Forrest on his flank for two miles of the way, had not al- 
lowed his columns to be greatly delayed. And now Steed- 
man was sweeping up to the foot of the hill below the Snod- 
grass House. As he reported to Thomas, coming in from 
toward the Kelly farm was another well-ordered column. 
It proved to be Van Derveer returning from the charge upon 
Breckenridge in the Kelly field. The map shows how he 
had left Brannan's line just before the break and hastened 
with deployed lines toward the left ; how thus deployed he 
had marched from the woods to be enfiladed from Breckin- 
ridge's front as the latter emerged from the woods and burst 
upon the Union rear. Here, under this fire, he whirled his 
brigade to the left, delivered a full volley at pistol range 
into the enemy's faces, charged into their lines on a run, 
drove them back on their batteries, and pursued both infantry 
and artillery to a point beyond the Union left, where Grose, 
coming from the rear of Palmer, completed the work. The 
dotted line shows Van Derveer's return. He, too, had moved 
without orders to the sound of tremendous firing about the 
Snodgrass house. Just as Steedman had hastily formed and 
assaulted Hindman's forces beyond the right of Brannan, Van 
Derveer joined his brigade to Steedman's left and moved also 
to the assault. Steedman seized a regimental flag and rode 
with it in his hands to the top. His command was the bri- 
gades of those splendid soldiers, John G-. Mitchell and 
Walter C. Whittaker. 

One (Whittaker's) plunged into the gorge through which 
Hindman's left was pouring, the rest of the line, with Van 
Derveer on its left, charged for the ridge. In twenty minutes 
it was carried and all of Hindman's forces were driven from 
it and out of the ravine. Whittaker had been wounded and 
four of his five staff officers either killed or mortally wounded. 
One-fifth of Steedman's force had been disabled in the charge. 
Van Derveer's loss was considerable, but less in proportion, 
as he was not fairly in front of Hindman, as Steedman was. 
Twice Hindman turned his recoiling troops to recapture the 
position, but finally abandoned the effort and relinquished 
the ridge to Steedman. The center and right of Longstreet's 
third assault was in like manner repelled. In this move- 
ment the Fourth Kentucky, Col. R. M. Kelley, joined Van 
Derveer and fought with him till night. 

LofC. 



45 

The coming of Steedman was more than an inspiration. It 
was more than the holding of the right. He brought 100,000 
rounds of cartridges and artillery ammunition — far more 
welcome than diamonds. Regiments in the line had been 
fighting, even at thatearly hour, with the bayonet and clubbed 
muskets. Now, when Longstreet's right came on in aid of 
the attempt of Hindman to hold his position on the west 
they were received with terrific and continuing fire, and as 
the lines of gray, with desperate valor, neared the summit 
Wood's men and Brannan's rushed at them with the bayonet 
and broke their ranks, rolled them down the slopes, and on 
Wood's front, with help of a direet fire from Aleshire's 
battery on the left and a terrible enfilading fire from Battery 
I, Fourth Regular Artillery, on Brannan's left, under those 
splendid young soldiers. Lieutenants Frank G. Smith and 
George B. Rodney, drove them in disorder beyond their 
artillery. 

At this time both Confederate wings were calling for re- 
enforcements. Bragg's reply to Longstreet was that the 
right was so badly shattered that it could not help him. 

When Steedman's coming with four thousand men had so 
changed the whole current of the battle, what if the seven 
thousand men under Sheridan and Negley about McFarland's 
and Roasville, much nearer than Steedman was, had been 
brought up ? How the officers who were there could stay 
themselves, or manage to keep the men, is a mystery sick- 
ening to think about. 

Hindman thus tells of the attack by which he carried the 
ridge to the right of Brannan, before Steedman arrived : 

"In a few minutes a terrific contest ensued, which con- 
tinued, at close quarters, without any intermission, over four 
hours. Our troops attacked again and again with a courage 
worthy of their past achievements. The enemy fought with 
determined obstinacy and repeatedly repulsed us, but only to 
be again assailed. As showing the fierceness of the fight, 
the fact is mentioned that on our extreme left the bayonet 
was used and men were also killed and wounded with clubbed 
muskets." 

Of the attack of Steedman's men in the ravine, where they 
rushed on the Confederate line with the bayonet, pushed in 
among the guns and killed gunners at their posts, Hindman 
further says : "I have never known Federal troops to fight 
so well. It is just to say, also, that I never saw Confederate 
soldiers fight better." Of the second attack upon Brannan's 
position, which was repulsed, Kershaw, commanding in 
Longstreet's troops from Virginia, said: "This was one of 
the heaviest attacks of the war on a single point." 



46 

Up to the time of Steedman's arrival there had been a 
break between Reynolds and Wood, but the flank of the 
former in advance of the latter somewhat covered it. Upon 
this point Longstreet now organized a heavy attack. But 
the lull on the left, arising from the rebels there having been, 
as Bragg expressed it, "so badly beaten back" that they 
could be of no service on his left, made it practicable to 
strengthen the Union center. Hazen was found to have am- 
munition, and was moved with celerity into the gap, and 
Grose, Johnson's reserve, replaced him. Hazen arrived none 
too soon. His lines were hardly established before Long- 
street's right was upon him, lapping over upon Reynold's 
front, and then, from Reynolds to Steedman, there was one 
continuing hell of battle. Garfield, who had come up with 
an escort, having ridden from Rossville, after reporting to 
Thomas, moved along the ranks of his old brigade (Harker, 
of Wood), encouraging the men, and giving evidence against 
all loiterers at the gaps in the rear that every officer and 
man of them could easily have reached the field. 

Longstreet's columns assault at every point, as rapidly as 
his lines rolled back from the crest could be reformed. He 
had ten brigades in front of Brannan and Steedman, while 
these ofiicers had only four unbroken in organization, and 
fragments of two others. One brigade of Preston, which 
assaulted Wood and Hazen's line, had over 2,000 men in the 
movement. The successive movements, rather the tremen- 
dous dashes of these lines against the hill, was like the ad- 
vance of breakers with which ocean storms attack the shore. 
But, as surely, each wave with its crest of steel, its spray of 
smoke, and its glitter of fire broke and swept back with dead 
and wounded in its terrible undertow. It was treason, but 
magnificent. Such was the scene which these soldiers of 
Thomas saw on the Snodgrass Hill throughout the afternoon 
till dusk. 

To relieve the left Polk was ordered at 3 o'clock, to attack 
in force with the whole right wing. But it required much 
time to organize those battered lines for assault, but when 
done, it was, indeed, formidable. The second map will make 
it plain. Cleburne, with four brigades, was deployed before 
Palmer and Johnson. Jackson and Polk's brigades lapped 
over Baird. Cheatham was in a second line. The map gives 
his position wrongly, though it is taken from the original 
ofiicial map in the War Department. Ranged further to the 
right, and crossing the State and Lafayette road at Mo- 
Daniel's, and thus massed against the Union left, were the 
divisions of Breckinridge and Liddell, Armstrong's dis- 
mounted cavalry division of Forrest, and Forrest's artillery. 



4-7 

While Grose, of Preston, was assaulting Hazen and Wood 
this attack on the Union lelt began. But, as before, the 
brigades that moved up to the log breastworks were speedily 
shattered, though this time they took their artillery through 
the thickets with them, pushing it by hand. 

Once more, as the assauit was made on Baird's left, there 
came a Union cliarge across the Kelly field, the fourth for 
the day. This time it was Willich, the reserve of Johnson. 
Withdrawing from lineand facingnorth, hesweptalong on the 
run and with cheers. His lines dashed into the woods at the 
point where Stanley and Grose had charged before, and with- 
out a halt sprang into the faces of the advancing Confederates. 
King's regulars and Barnes gave brave help, and once more 
the immediate left was cleared. The force on the road by the 
McDaniel house, though unbroken, was not advanced. Later, 
an assault on Reynoldsand Palmer was ordered, but, naturally, 
it was feeble after so many repulses at the breastworks. At 
half-[)ast 5 there was quiet again along the Union left. 
Longstreet, however, in front of the right, was active for 
another hour, though at every point unsuccessful. 

At half-after 5 General Thomas, having full discretion, 
decided to withdraw to occupy the passes in his rear at Mc- 
Farland and Rossville, which controlled the roads to Chat- 
tanooga. His line w*s solid at every point. Both wings of 
the Confederates were at bay. Their right was too much broken 
to successfully assaulttheUnion left. The Union right, though 
its ammunition ran low, and its officers were constantly 
searching the boxes of the killed and wounded for cartridges, 
was becoming practiced in the use of the bayonet against as- 
saulting lines, and in spite of the persistence of Longstreet's 
men, had begun to feel comfortable in its position. The 
whole line could have been held until night. But daylight 
was wanted to set the army in orderly motion toward the 
gaps which controlled the city. After that was accomplished 
the darkness afforded the needed cover to complete the move- 
ment. It was because Chattanooga, and not the Chicka- 
mauga woods, was the objective of the campaign that the 
army withdrew to Rossville. It was in no sense a military 
retreat. 

If Thomas had not occupied these passes in the night, 
Bragg' could have done so, and the object he had in view 
would then have been accomplished. Had Thomas allowed 
it, Bragg would have been only too glad to have withdrawn 
from the field and "retreated" on Rossville. Thomas did 
not permit it, but went there first, and Chattanooga was won. 

The withdrawal involved some fighting. The movement 
began on the right of Reynolds. Palmer, Johnson, and 



48 

Baird were to follow in succession, all leaving their skirmish- 
ers in their works. 

Reynolds formed his brigades by the flank on each side of 
the Lafayette road, King on the right and Tiirchin on the 
left. Thus he advanced northward along the Kelly field 
toward Rossville. G-eneral Thomas followed at the head of 
the column. As they passed a short distance beyond the 
south line of the field they encountered the advancing troops 
which had taken part in the last rebel attack. Instantly 
Thomas ordered Reynolds to cause Turchin to file to the 
left, and after thus changing front to ''charge and clear 
them out." The line of Turchin's charge is shown on the 
map. Filing into the wood to the left at double-quick, he 
faced to the front while thus moving, and his lines darted at 
a run into the faces of the enemy. It was one of the bravest 
and most brilliant, most important and effective charges of 
the day — the fifth over those Kelly fields. At the same 
moment King, forcing his way along the road, fell on the 
flank of Liddell's division and broke it. Dan McCook, who 
had been active during the day on the flank of Forrest, ad- 
vanced and opened with his artillery on the rebel rear, and 
after short but sharp fighting the formidable array was 
driven back and the way to Rossville was open. 

Turchin and King moved by the roads to McFarland's Gap. 
Baird, Johnson, and Palmer followed over the same roads. 
They were attacked as they left their works and crossed the 
Kelly field, but order in their columns was restored as soon 
as they gained the shelter of the woods on the west of the 
road. Hazen and Wood then followed without molestation. 
Steedman withdrew at six o'clock from the extreme right, 
and Brannan was left alone on Horseshoe Ridge. The sun 
was down. The shadows were thickening in the woods be- 
fore him, and yet Longstreet's men remained on the slopes, 
and several times appeared in detachments close along his 
lines. Suddenly a line of Hindman's men were found on 
the slope where Steedman had been. By some strange over- 
sight Brannan had not been notified that his right was un- 
protected. A hasty examination in the gathering dusk 
showed another rebel line on the slope directly in the rear, 
and which had come round through the gap where Steed- 
man's right had been, and was evidently forming for an 
assault. The Thirty- fifth Ohio, of Van Derveer's brigade, 
was thrown back to face both these lines. Fragments of 
five regiments more, which had opportunely arrived, were 
given to the commander of the Thirty-fifth. His own regi- 
ment had one round and one in the guns. This was placed 
in front. The others, with fixed bayonets, were formed in 



49 

the rear. Just before dark a rebel officer rode in on the 
line and asked what troops were here. He was shot by the 
near outposts. 

Then came a scattering fire from the flank of the rebel line 
along the ridge, next a volley from the Thirty-fifth, and a 
silent awaiting results behind its line of bayonets. The vol- 
ley had scattered the enemy on the ridge, and the force in the 
rear had withdrawn. These were the last shots on the right. 
Following them there was absolute quiet everywhere on the 
field. The stillness was painful and awful. Brannan's officers 
and men, peering down into the dim and smoking ravine, 
saw long lines of fire creeping over the leaves, and in and out 
among the wounded and the dead. It was a sight far more 
horrible than any of the pictured presentations of Dante's 
Inferno. From this scene, with the low wailings of the suf- 
ferers in their ears, they turned in triumph and exultant to 
form the rear guard of Thomas's advance to Rossville. Tur- 
chin and Willich fought last on the left and formed the rear 
guard there ; Van Derveer covered the right. And thus the 
Army of the Cumberland at midnight occupied the passes 
which made the possession of Chattanooga secure. 

There had been no such disordered rush of the broken por- 
tions of the army on Chattanooga as the panic-stricken cor- 
respondent of an Eastern paper depicted, who gave visions 
of his own early flight to the country as news. Only a small 
part of the broken wing drifted to Chattanooga. From 7,000 
to 10,000 stopped at Rossville, and were fairly organized 
there. When Thomas's forces arrived the whole army was 
placed in position on Missionary Ridge, and in front of it, and 
remained in line of battle throughout the whole of the 21st. 

At nightfall the army advanced to Chattanooga — advanced 
is the word ; the term " retreated," so persistently used in 
regard to this movement has no place in the truthful history 
of this campaign. The Army of the Cumberland was on its 
way to Chattanooga, the city it set out to capture. It had 
halted at Chickamauga, on its line of advance, to fight for its 
objective. On the night of the 21st it began its last march 
for the city. Every loot of it was a march in advance, and 
not retreat. At sunrise of the 22d Brannan's division, which 
was the rear guard, reached the city, and the campaign for 
Chattanooga was at an end. Until that morning broke the 
great bulk of the Army of the Cumberland had never seen 
the place. 

Thus, crowned with success, though won at terrible cost, 
closed the last campaign of General Rosecrans. It was 
matchless in its strategy, unequaled in the skill and energy 
with which his outnumbered army was concentrated for bat- 



50 

tie. Its stubborn, desperate, and heroic fighting throughout 
the two days' battle was not surpassed, and, judged by its 
returns of dead and wounded, not equaled in any one of the 
great battles of the war. It secured the city which it marched 
to capture. The loss was no greater than the country would 
have expected at any time in attaining that result. If Rose- 
crans had crossed the river in front of the city and captured 
it with even greater loss, the country would have gone wild 
with enthusiasm. Had he been properly supported from 
Washington he would have entered it without a battle, since, 
if there had been even a show of activity elsewhere, Bragg's 
army would not have been nearly doubled with re-enforce- 
ments and thus enabled to march back on Chattanooga after 
its retreat from the city. The reverse on the field on Sunday 
was not the disaster which at the time it was declared to be, 
and which it has ever since suited several writers of military 
fiction to persistently represent. The account herewith pre- 
sented shows that after General Thomas consolidated his lines 
at 1 o'clock on Sunday not a single position was carried and 
held by the enemy. The withdrawal, which begun soon after 
5 o'clock, was not in any sense forced. There is not an offi- 
cer or soldier who fought on those lines but knows that they 
could have been held throughout till dark. 

The accepted version of Sunday's break on Rosecrans's 
right is that the two corps of Crittenden and McCook were 
swept off the field ; but only five brigades of McCook's 
entire corps left the field, and the fragments which went from 
Crittenden would not exceed two brigades. Palmer's and 
Johnson's divisions, which fought splendidly to the end 
under Thomas on the left, were respectively from Critten- 
den's and McCook's corps. Wood belonged to Crittenden. 
Barnes's brigade, which fought on the extreme left, and part 
of Dick's and Samuel Beatty's were all of Van Clove's divi- 
sion of Crittenden's corps. In other words, the large part 
of Crittenden's force fought to the last. Four regiments of 
Wilder's brigade of Reynolds's division were detached and 
cut off with the right, and a considerable part of Negley's 
division of Thomas went to the rear, chiefly through the bad 
conduct of its commander. We have seen, however, how 
persistently and effectively Stanley's and John Beatty's 
brigades of that division fought, and Beatty and Greneral 
Charles Grosvenor and Sirwell and Stoughton, of these 
brigades, were all found fighting like private soldiers on the 
hill with Wood and Brannan to the last. The battle of 
Sunday was, then, not the fight of any one corps, but of the 
Army of the Cumberland. There was no disorderly retreat 
of the army on Chattanooga, and nothing approaching it. 



51 

The greater portion of the right wing, which was cut off and 
certainly thrown into much confusion, was reorganized at 
Rossville, and occupied its place in line at that point through- 
out the next day and until the army moved on in the night 
to occupy Chattanooga. The battle was desperate from the 
moment it opened till its close. For the most part the lines 
fought at close range and, in the countless assaults, often 
hand to hand. On the first day there were no field works of 
any kind. On the second Thomas was protected by such rude 
log works as could be hastily thrown together. Brannan and 
Steedman were without a semblance of works. Thebattlein the 
main, on both sides, was dogged, stand-up fighting far within 
the limit of point blank range. For the second day, on the 
Confederate side, the contest was one continued series of 
brave and magnificent assaults. 

General Rosecrans had crossed the Tennessee with an 
effective force of all arms equipped for duty of a few hundred 
more than 60,000. Of this number Wagner's brigade, with 
2,061 effectives, held Chattanooga, leaving the Union force 
in front of Bragg slightly less than 58,000. It was several 
thousand less at the battle, Post's brigade of Davis' division 
and three regiments of infantry and one battery being en- 
gaged in guarding supply trains. 

In a letter from General Lee to President Davis, dated 
September 14, 1863, the following figures of Bragg's actual 
and prospective strength are thus stated : 

''If the report sent to me by General Cooper since my 
return from Richmond is correct. General Bragg had, on the 
20th of August last, 51,101 effective men ; General Buckner, 
16,118. He was to receive from General Johnson 9,000. 
His total force will, therefore, be 76,219, as large a number 
as I presume he can operate with. This is independent of 
the local troops, which, you may recollect, he reported as 
exceeding his expectations." 

It will be well to remember, in connection with these offi- 
cial figures, that Bragg, after the battle, reported Long- 
street's force, which was not included by Lee, at 5,000. 
This, according to the figures furnished General Lee, gave 
Bragg 81,219. According to General Johnson's corre- 
spondence, after he had sent 9,000 to Bragg, he subse- 
quently dispatched him two small brigades, and these, later, 
reached him the day before the battle. 

A reference to the losses on each side will show that there 
has been no exaggeration in the description of the fighting. 
Eosecrans's loss was 16,179. This included 4,774 missing, 
of which a large number were killed or wounded. Bragg's 
losses, as compiled and estimated at the War Records Office, 



52 

were 17,804. Thus the entire loss for each army was over 
twenty-five per cent, of the entire force of each. Hill's 
corps of the Confederate right wing lost 2,990 out of a total 
8,884. Of the 22,885 in Longstreet's left wing the loss was 
7,856, with one brigade heavily engaged not reported. 
Longstreet's loss on Sunday afternoon was thirty-six per 
cent, of those engaged. 

The casualties in Jackson's brigade of Cleburne's division, 
which assaulted on Baird's fronts was 35 per cent., while the 
Fifth Georgia, of that brigade, lost 55 per cent., and the 
First Confederate Regulars 43 per cent. G-regg's brigade, 
of Buckner's corps, lost 652 out of 1,425. Helm's Ken- 
tucky brigade, on the Union left, lost 75 per cent, of its 
strength. Bate's brigade lost 7 officers killed and 61 officers 
wounded, and the total casualties were 607 out of 1,316. 
All his field officers except three were killed or wounded. 
The losses in Govan's brigade, of Walker's corps, exceeded 
50 per cent. Deas, who fought in front of Steedman's as- 
sault, lost 745 out of 1,942. Walthall, of Walker, lost 705 
out of 1,727. On the Union side Steedman in four hours lost 
1,787 out of 3,700, and all were killed and wounded but one. 
Brannan's division had 5,998 engaged. Its casualties were 
2,174, or 38 per cent. The loss in Van Derveer's brigade, 
of this division, in four regiments and one battery, was 840 
out of 1,788 engaged, or 49 per cent. Croxton's brigade, of 
the same division, made up of five regiments, lost 938. Of 
Van Derveer's regiments the Ninth Ohio lost 50 per cent. ; 
the Thirty-fifth Ohio, a small fraction less than 50 per cent. ; 
the Second Minnesota 192, or exactly 50 per cent., and the 
Eighty-seventh Indiana about half of its number. General 
Wood lost 1,070 in two brigades. 

These figures become the more significant when compared 
with the statement of losses in the world's noted battles. 
General Wheeler, the distinguished Confederate cavalry com- 
mander, thus vividly presented this question at the gathering 
of the Society of the Army of the Cumberland and Confeder- 
ates, at Chattanooga, in 1881 : 

" Waterloo was one of the most desperate and bloody fields 
chronicled in European history and yet Wellington's casual- 
ties were less than 12 per cent., his losses being 2,432 
killed and 9,528 wounded out of 90,000 men, while at Shiloh, 
the first great battle in which General Grant was engaged, 
one side lost in killed and wounded 9,740outof 34,000, while 
their opponents reported their killed and wounded at 9,616, 
making the casualties about 30 per cent. At the great battle 
of Wagram Napoleon lost but about 5 per cent. At Wurz- 
burg the French lost but 3| per cent., and yet the army gave 



53 

up the field and retreated to the Rhine. At Racour Marshal 
Saxe lost but 2^ per cent. At Zurich Massena lost but 8 
per cent. At Lagriz Frederick lost but 6| per cent. At 
Malplaquet Marlborough lost but 10 per cent., and at Ra- 
millies the same intrepid commander lost but 6 per cent. At 
Contras Henry of Navarra was reported as cut to pieces, yet 
his loss was less than 10 per cent. At Lodi Napoleon lost 
1;^ per cent. At Yalmy Frederick lost but 3 per cent., and 
at the great battles of Marengo and Austerlitz, sanguinary 
as they were, Napoleon lost an average of less than 14^ per 
cent. At Magenta and Solferino, in 1859, the average loss 
of both armies was less than 9 per cent. At Konigrattz, in 
1866, it was 6 per cent. At Werth, Specheran, Mars la Tour, 
Gravelotte, and Sedan, in 1870, the average loss was 12 per 
cent. At Linden General Moreau lost but 4 per cent., and 
the Archduke John lost but 7 per cent, in killed and wounded. 
Americans' can scarcely call this a lively skirmish. 

" At Perry ville, Murfreesboro, Chickamauga, Atlanta, 
Gettysburg, Mission Ridge, the Wilderness, and Spottsyl- 
vania the loss frequently reached and sometimes exceeded 
forty per cent., and the average. of killed and wounded on 
one side or the other was over thirty per cent." 

Those who remained at Chickamauga and fought till the 
night of Sunday came, when, for many regiments, every 
other comrade was dead or wounded, were satisfied with the 
result, and have always maintained that Chickamauga was 
fought for Chattanooga, and have so regarded it as a great 
and notable victory. General D. H. Hill in a recent Century 
article thus sums up the result for the Confederate side ; "A 
breathing space was allowed him ; the panic among his 
troops subsided, and Chattanooga — the objective point of tlie 
campaign — was held. There was no more splendid fighting 
in '61, when the flower of the Southern youth was in the 
field, than was displayed in those bloody days of September, 
'63, But it seems to me that the elan of the Southern 
soldier was never seen after Chickamauga — that brilliant 
dash which had distinguished him on a hundred fields was 
gone forever. He was too intelligent not to kn'ow that the 
cutting in two of Georgia meant death to ail his hopes. He 
knew that Longstreet's absence was imperiling Lee's safety, 
and that what had to be done must be done quickly. The 
delay to strike was exasperating to him ; the failure to strike 
after the success was crushing to all his longings for an in- 
dependent South. He fought stoutly to the last, but after 
Chickamauga, with the sullenness of despair and without the 
enthusiam of hope. That ' barren victory ' sealed the fate 
of the Southern Confederacy." 



54 

The authorities at Washington, to cover their own short- 
comings and inexcusable neglect^ chose to deepen the erro- 
neous impression that the Army of the Cumberland had been 
routed and driven back to Chattanooga in confusion. The 
removal of General Rosecrans was determined upon. In fact, 
it had been only a question of opportunity since the cam- 
paign opened. There was only needed the misrepresenta- 
tions about Chickamauga to furnish this. 

In the mean time General Rosecrans thoroughly fortified 
Chattanooga and was actually engaged in preparations to 
open the river for supplies, exactly as it was afterwards done, 
when he was removed. In fact, his plan was partially per- 
fected before he crossed the river, as is shown by the fact that 
he made written contracts with Northern firms to have bridges 
completed by October 1 for the Tennessee at Bridgeport, and 
the Running Water at Wauhatchie. He had ordered the 
thorough reconnoitering of the river bank opposite the north 
end of Missionary Ridge — where Sherman afterward crossed 
with a view of a flank attack there. It was, therefore, al- 
together fitting and proper that the order for his relief should 
arrive while he was absent making a personal examination of 
the vicinity of Brown's Ferry, where he intended to throw a 
bridge to unite with Hooker from Bridgeport and open the 
river exactly as was afterward done. He had even notified 
Barker of the plan three days before and ordered him to be 
ready to execute his part of it. General Thomas, at first, 
insisted that he would resign rather than appear to acquiesce 
in Rosecrans' s removal by accepting the command. It was 
at Rosecrans' s earnest solicitation that he reconsidered this 
determination. But he did not besitate to say that the order 
was cruelly unjust. When General Garfield left for Wash- 
ington soon after the battle he immediately charged him to 
do all he could to have Rosecrans righted. These will be 
new statements to most, but they are true. 

The survivors of the Army of the Cumberland should awake 
to great pride in this notable field of Chickamauga. Why 
should it not, as well as Eastern fields, be marked by monu- 
ments, and ?ts lines accurately preserved for history? There 
was no more magnificent fighting during the war than both 
armies did there. Both sides might well unite in preserving 
the field where both, in a military sense, won such renown. 

H. V. B. 



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